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The volume of U.S. shrimp imports has increased substantially since 1980, largely due to an 
increase in world shrimp production.  More specifically, U.S. shrimp imports have increased from 649 
(headless weight) million pounds in 1997 to 1,236 million pounds in 2010, while the price of imports has 
declined over this same period. United States domestic production of shrimp has remained relatively stable 
during this period, while the U.S. dockside price declined. These trends suggest that the price-quantity 
relationship between U.S. domestic landings and the domestic price may be structurally different from the 
price-quantity relationship between the volume of shrimp imports and the import price.  The central thesis 
of this study is that neither the ordinary demand specification, nor the inverse demand specification, are 
independently adequate for modeling the U.S. shrimp market.  Consequently, a mixed demand model that 
simultaneously allows for both quantity-dependent and price-dependent specifications is more appropriate 
for estimating the U.S. demand for shrimp. 
  The general objective of this study is to develop and estimate a system of demand equations to 
analyze the U.S. demand for shrimp landed in the Gulf of Mexico. Specifying a valid system of demand 
equations for the U.S. shrimp market will help researchers and government organizations better understand 
the determinants of U.S. shrimp demand. To accomplish this objective, a mixed demand system was 
adopted. A mixed set of demand functions contains both coefficients of a regular demand system and an 
inverse demand system (Barton, 1989). This study adopts the Brown and Lee parameterization (2006), 
known as the mixed Rotterdam demand system. The shrimp products were divided into two subgroups: 1) 
shrimp imports (group a); and 2) Gulf of Mexico shrimp landings (group b). Countries considered in the 
analysis include China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, and a final category 
includes all other exporting countries. Demand for Gulf shrimp is specified by size of shrimp with three 
sizes: Large, Medium, and Small. U.S. imports from these countries were modeled in a quantity dependent 
framework, while demand for domestic shrimp products was modeled in a price dependent framework.  
The summary statistics and estimated results for the model parameters indicate that Thailand has 




theoretically expected, all own-price elastisities of regular demand are negative, implying an inverse 
relation between the quantity of imports from a selected country and its price of imports. Among all 
countries, China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam have the largest and almost the same own-price elasticities. 
Thailand’s own-price elasticity is smaller than these countries, although it has the largest share of U.S. total 
expenditures on shrimp products. The Lerner index along with Thailand’s largest share in U.S. total 
expenditures on shrimp reveals that Thailand has some degree of market power relative to China, India, 
Mexico, and Vietnam in the U.S. shrimp industry. 
Cross-price elastisities of regular demand were positive, indicating that the price of a selected 
country’s shrimp products have a direct effect on the quantity of other countries’ shrimp exports. The 
positive cross-price elastisities also indicate that U.S. shrimp imports from different countries are substitutes 
for each other, as expected. Thailand’s export prices have the largest cross-price elastisities. 
The price elasticity/flexibility of inverse demand illustrates that no country’s export prices have a 
substantial effect on any size of Gulf landings. The largest effect is associated with about 0.02% on the 
price of small size Gulf landings for a 1% change in the price of Thailand’s exports to the United States. 
Vietnam, India, Mexico, China, and Thailand’s income elasticities are greater than one. Therefore, 
one can conclude that a change in U.S. expenditures on shrimp products not only increases the consumption 
of these countries’ shrimp products but that the proportion (share) of these products also goes up in U.S. 
total expenditure on shrimp. The homogeneity condition results are similar to the conclusion obtained from 
the Lerner Index, indicating Thailand dominance in the U.S. shrimp market. 
Income elasticities for inverse demand represent the Gulf dockside price sensitivities relative to a 
change in U.S. expenditures on shrimp. Results illustrate that if U.S. expenditure on shrimp products 








  Seafood is a major part of U.S. cuisine and the U.S. is ranked third behind China and Japan, in total 
consumption of fish and shellfish. In 2009, the U.S. total seafood consumption was 4.83 billion pounds 
with an associated value of $75.5 billion. Shrimp, with a 2009 per-capita consumption of 4.1 pounds, 
accounted for more than one-quarter of the total 2009 U.S. per capita consumption of seafood (15.8 pounds) 
(NOAA’s Fisheries of the U.S. reports). 
Commercial fishing is one of the first industries in the United States as early explorers came to the 
Gulf coast seeking new lands and “gifts of the sea” (Louisiana Seafood Promotion & Marketing Board). 
The Gulf of Mexico commercial shrimping industry is large and the contribution of it to local and overall 
economies can be categorized in several activities associated with processing, packing, wholesale 
distribution, vessel maintenance, repair, and refueling. Averaging $409 million annually during 2000-09, 
the dockside value of U.S. Gulf of Mexico (defined as the coastal states extending from the west coast of 
Florida through Texas) shrimp landings exceeded that of any other species or species groups (NMFS, 
NOAA, 2010). 
Before 1980, the world supply of shrimp consisted primarily of wild product. As a result of 
technological advances world farm-raised shrimp production has increased, significantly since the early 
1980s (Saravanan and Santhanam, 2008). 
 The general purpose of this dissertation is to estimate the U.S. demand for shrimp by introducing 
a new structural demand system that is believe to be, in theory, more theoretically appealing than previous 
estimation procedures. As a prelude, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to discussing changes in the 
world shrimp market with special emphasis being given to the U.S. shrimp market. Then the problem 






1.1. World Shrimp Market1 
The world shrimp supply consists of two products; captured shrimp and cultured shrimp. Growth 
in the production of these two products over the period of 1970-2011 is considered in figure 1.1. As 
indicated, captured supply increased from about 1.0 billion pounds (headless weight) during the early 1970s 
to about 3.0 billion pounds annually during the decade beginning in 2000. Overall, there was as apparent 
upward trend in the production of wild shrimp through the 1990s and relative stability in the production 
during the most recent decade. 
By comparison, production of cultured shrimp was relatively stable during the 1970s, but thereafter 
increased rapidly exceeding the one-billion pound mark (headless weight) in 1990. By 2002, production of 
cultured shrimp had equaled the captured production and thereafter exceeded the production of captured 
product by an increasing amount. Overall, the production of cultured product increased from 2.39 billion 
pounds in 2002 to 6.12 billion pounds in 2011, while the production of captured shrimp increased by only 
0.63 billion pounds (from 2.28 billion pounds in 2002 to 2.91 billion pounds in 2011). 
 
Figure1. 1. World Shrimp Productions by Type, 1970-2011. 
Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics 
                                                            












































Primary world shrimp producers, especially cultured shrimp, include Asia, Central America, and 
South America. In general, production of wild and cultured shrimp in Asia approximated one another 
throughout the 1990s. Thereafter, cultured production increased rapidly while growth in captured 
production was much more moderate. Overall, production of cultured shrimp in the Asian region increased 
from 0.84 billion pounds in 1990 to 5.35 billion pounds in 2011, while production of captured shrimp 
increased from 0.70 billion pounds to 1.72 billion pounds (figure 1.2). 
 
 
Figure1. 2. Asian Countries Shrimp Productions by Type, 1990-2011. 
Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics 
 
With the exception of a few years in the early 1990s, South American production of cultured shrimp 
exceeded the production of captured shrimp (figure 1.3). Significant growth in the production of cultured, 
however, was apparent during the most recent decade. Thereafter, South American production followed a 
similar pattern to Asian production. Overall, South American production of cultured shrimp increased from 
0.13 billion pounds in 2000 to 0.51 billion pounds in 2011 while growth in the production of captured 
















































Figure1. 3. South American Countries Shrimp Productions by Type, 1990-2011. 
Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics 
 
Production of captured shrimp in the Central America exceeded the cultured production until 2003 
(figure 1.4). Overall, production of captured shrimp in this region exhibited no long-run growth. By 
comparison, production of cultured shrimp increased from less than 50 million pounds annually prior to the 
mid-1990s to more than 200 million pounds annually since the mid-2000s. 
 
 






















































































As indicated by in the information in table 1.1, world shrimp production is dominated by Asia 
which accounted for 78% of world production in 2009. South America represented as additional 6.8% of 
world production while Central America accounted for about 4% (table 1.1). 
 



























1990 1.53 0.11 0.26 0.68 2.59 59.2 4.4 10.0 26.4 
1991 1.81 0.13 0.31 0.71 2.96 61.1 4.3 10.4 24.2 
1992 1.87 0.13 0.34 0.70 3.03 61.6 4.1 11.2 23.0 
1993 1.88 0.16 0.29 0.70 3.03 62.2 5.3 9.5 23.1 
1994 2.12 0.16 0.29 0.70 3.27 64.7 4.8 9.0 21.4 
1995 2.13 0.17 0.29 0.77 3.37 63.2 5.1 8.7 22.9 
1996 2.15 0.16 0.29 0.79 3.38 63.5 4.6 8.5 23.3 
1997 2.13 0.17 0.33 0.79 3.43 62.1 5.1 9.7 23.1 
1998 2.24 0.17 0.37 0.86 3.64 61.5 4.8 10.1 23.5 
1999 2.64 0.18 0.32 0.94 4.07 64.9 4.3 7.8 23.0 
2000 2.89 0.17 0.27 1.01 4.34 66.5 4.0 6.2 23.3 
2001 3.01 0.19 0.34 0.98 4.52 66.5 4.3 7.5 21.6 
2002 3.11 0.20 0.35 1.00 4.66 66.8 4.3 7.6 21.4 
2003 4.59 0.25 0.44 0.98 6.26 73.4 4.0 7.0 15.6 
2004 4.84 0.25 0.41 1.06 6.56 73.7 3.8 6.3 16.1 
2005 5.41 0.30 0.41 1.01 7.13 75.9 4.2 5.7 14.1 
2006 5.89 0.35 0.52 1.02 7.79 75.6 4.5 6.7 13.1 
2007 6.37 0.35 0.53 0.96 8.20 77.6 4.2 6.5 11.7 
2008 6.36 0.37 0.53 0.94 8.19 77.6 4.5 6.5 11.5 
2009 6.51 0.33 0.56 0.91 8.32 78.3 4.0 6.8 10.9 
2010 6.87 0.31 0.65 0.91 8.74 78.6 3.5 7.5 10.4 






Asia was not only the world’s largest shrimp producer but was also the world’s largest shrimp 
exporters; accounting for more than 60% of the world’s total exports in 2009. Exports from South America 
and Central America comprised 11% and 4% of the world’s total exports, respectively (figure 1.5). This 
suggests that relative exports from these three major regions are closely related to production. 
 
 
Figure 1.5. World Shrimp Exports Percentage Share by Region, 1990-2009. 
Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics 
 
An increase in the world shrimp productions, especially after 2001, allowed for a rapid increase in 
world shrimp consumption. The United States, Japan, and European Union represent the primary shrimp 
importers. In 1990, these three regions imported more than 80% of the world shrimp supply. The total share 
of these countries/regions fell to 70%, in 2009. Japanese imports declined from 27% to 12% over the period 
of 1990-2009, while, at the same time, EU and U.S. shares increased from 33% and 21%, respectively, to 





























  Figure 1.6. World Shrimp Distribution by Country/Region, 1990-2009. 
  Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics 
 
1.2. The U.S. Shrimp Market 
Annual U.S. shrimp production for the period of 1997-2010, along with imports, is given in table 
1.2. As indicated, while imports have been increasing throughout the period of study, there had been no 
upward trend in domestic production. The Gulf of Mexico accounts for the vast majority of U.S. shrimp 
production and it is generally believe that effort has historically been large enough to harvest virtually all 
available shrimp. The long-run stability in domestic production in conjunction with increasing imports 
implies that the share of U.S. shrimp consumption supplied by domestic production has fallen sharply over 
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     Table 1.2. U.S. Annual Shrimp Landings and Imports, 2000-2010. 
Year 








1997 117.90 437.82 648.86 2.96 
1998 150.80 461.21 696.09 3.11 
1999 143.81 463.98 732.26 3.14 
2000 173.48 640.40 762.11 3.76 
2001 151.42 480.09 883.89 3.63 
2002 138.50 370.56 947.67 3.43 
2003 153.69 346.85 1,113.03 3.76 
2004 154.86 353.53 1,142.83 3.69 
2005 131.66 348.15 1,173.21 3.67 
2006 178.47 385.56 1,307.22 4.14 
2007 138.34 354.32 1,231.79 3.91 
2008 116.01 354.54 1,248.89 4.11 
2009 142.08 292.85 1,217.41 3.78 
2010 108.66 328.21 1,236.39 4.29 
     Source: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
 
Figure 1.7. The U.S. Shrimp Landings, Imports, Consumption, and Market Share, 1997-2010.  
Source: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
                                                            
2 Shrimp landings are converted to headless weight.  







































































1.2.1. The U.S. Domestic Shrimp Market 
The Gulf of Mexico is the largest shrimp producing region in the United States with production 
from the region generally accounting for more than 70% of the nation’s total. White, pink, and brown 
shrimp are the major species harvested in the Gulf of Mexico (NOAA, 2010). In addition to the types of 
products, National Marine Fisheries Service reports the Gulf of Mexico shrimp landings in eight size 
categories (headless weight).   
Though exhibiting significant variation annual Gulf of Mexico landings have exhibited no 
increasing trend over the past twenty years (figure 1.8). Overall, annual production has varied from a low 
of 123 million pounds in 1980 to maximum of 135 million pounds in 2011.  
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Despite long-run stability of Gulf of Mexico production, the dockside prices are declining over 
time.  Poudel and Keithly (2008) suggest that the U.S. imports are the main reason for the decline in the 
Gulf dockside prices particularly since 2001.  
On the other hand, U.S. shrimpers have been experiencing an increase in diesel fuel prices since 
1997 (EIA, 2011). As estimated by Ward, Ozuna, and Griffin (1995), fuel costs comprise almost 25% of 
the total cost of commercial shrimp fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. A reduction in revenue due to a decline 
in the Gulf dockside price along with an increase in operating costs due to increase in diesel price has 
resulted in a classic cost/price squeeze. This condition resulted shrimpers exiting industry. In 1981, for 
example, the annual number of unique shrimpers’ vessels in the Vessel Operating Units File (VOUF) 
exceeded 6200. It had fallen to less than 4200 by 2002 (Nance, 2004). During the same period, the annual 
total number of shrimp trips taken in Gulf of Mexico offshore waters fell from more than 85,000 to less 
than 40,0004 (Nance, 2004). 
1.2.2. The U.S. Shrimp Imports 
The U.S. imported more than a quarter of the world total shrimp supplies in 2011and trails only 
European Union in terms of shrimp imports. The U.S. imports several shrimp products that have been 
segmented into 19 categories in National Marine Fisheries Service/Science and Technology website. For 
simplicity, these categories are rearranged into five groups in figure 1.9, which shows the U.S. shrimp 
imports for the period of 1991- 2011. 
During the 1991-2011 period the volume of all types of imported shrimp, except shell-on small 
size, have increased. However, relative shares have changed. Peeled frozen and fresh shrimp and 
miscellaneous shrimp shares, for example increased from 34% and 7% in 1991, respectively, to 38% and 
21% in 2011, by comparison, the shares of the other three products (Shell-on large, Shell-on medium, and 
Shell-on small) declined. Peeled frozen and fresh have the largest share among all types of shrimp imports 
                                                            




in 2011. At the same time, shell-on large and medium have the largest share after peeled shrimp and their 
shares are almost the same (19% and 20%, respectively). 
  
 
Figure 1.9. The U.S. Shrimp Imports by Product Type, 1991-2011. 
Miscellaneous = Breaded Frozen + Products Prepared for Dinners+ some other small volumes of imports. 
Shell-on Large= Shell-on Frozen < 15+ Shell-on F. 15/20+ Shell-on F. 21/25+ Shell-on F. 26/30. 
Shell-on Medium= Shell-on F. 31/40+ Shell-on F. 41/50+ Shell-on F. 51/60+ Shell-on F. 60/70. 
Shell-on Small= Shell-on Frozen > 70. 
Source: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov. 
 
The U. S. imports these products from more 50 countries around the world. These countries are 
including Asian, South America, and Central America countries. As figure 1.10 illustrates, Asian countries 
are the major shrimp exporters to the United States, having more than 75% of the share in 2011. South and 
Central America’s countries share 17% and 6% of the U.S. shrimp imports in 2011, respectively. All other 
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        Figure 1.10. The U.S. Shrimp Imports by Source Origin, 1991-2011. 
         Source: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov 
 
With growth in the world shrimp supply exceeding that of growth in world demand, the world 
shrimp price has fallen significantly since the early 1990s (figure 1.11). Given that imports represent such 
a large share of total U.S. supply (i.e. imports plus domestic production), one might expect that the domestic 
price follows that of the import price. This, as indicated in figure 1.11, is clearly the case. Overall, the U.S. 
domestic shrimp price mirrors the world shrimp price (figure1.11) suggesting that imports, at least in part, 
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      Figure 1.11. Shrimp Imports Price per Pound and Gulf of Mexico Dockside Price per Pound,  
      1990-2011. 
      Source: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov 
 
 
Comparing the Gulf of Mexico shrimp landings and the U.S. shrimp imports illustrates how small 
Gulf landings are relative to imports; the imported shrimp comprises a large share of the U.S. shrimp supply 
(more than 80%). 
1.3. Problem Statement 
In a brief, a significant increase in world shrimp production particularly after 2000 resulted in a 
rapid increase in U.S. imports. As indicated, Gulf shrimp producers’ revenue decreased as a result of decline 
in dockside prices. On the other hand, increase in fuel prices raised the shrimp producers’ operation costs.  
These two factors together forced many Gulf shrimpers to leave the market and decreased the number of  
Louisiana’s commercial fishing vessels and fishing boats from 15,800 in 1994 to 10,958 in 2002 (NOAA, 
NMFS, 1994 and 2002).  During the same period, the annual total number of shrimp trips taken in Gulf of 
Mexico offshore waters fell from more than 85,000 to less than 40,0005 (Nance, 2004). These facts imply 
                                                            



































































that the price variability can have disadvantageous influence on domestic producers and even the industry. 
Therefore, the price determination mechanism in U.S. shrimp market is an important subject. The shrimp 
market needs more investigation and studies to provide facts and information that can address this subject 
and help policy makers to find proper solutions for improving the shrimp producers’ situation. In spite of 
the importance of the shrimp industry in the Southern states and its share in the U.S. fishery industry, there 
have been only a few studies addressing this subject. To accomplish this goal, this study attempts to apply 
a new structural demand system model, known as the mixed Demand model, to analyze and quantify the 
determinants of U.S. shrimp demand and the factors which are affecting domestic prices (Gulf of Mexico 
dockside prices). In this analysis, the U.S. demand for imported shrimp and domestic shrimp (Gulf of 
Mexico landings) differentiated by exporting country and size classification, respectively.  
1.4. Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to develop and estimate a system of demand equations to 
analyze the U.S. demand for shrimp. Specifying a valid system of demand equations for the U.S. shrimp 
market will help researchers and government organizations better understand the determinants of U.S. 
shrimp demand. Because of the important role of shrimp products in the U.S. seafood industry, finding the 
key factors that influence demand is an important issue. Specifically, this study proposes the following 
objectives: 
1) To specify a theoretical model that accurately depicts the U.S. demand for shrimp and which 
differentiates imported shrimp from domestic production in the analysis; 
2) To empirically estimate the model developed under objective 1; 
3) To estimate price and income elasticities of shrimp imports, by source and determine whether 
source is an important factor in determining domestic price; 
4) To empirically estimate the quantity and scale flexibilities of Gulf shrimp demand. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, the literature of shrimp market 




mixed Rotterdam demand model will be introduced. Then the mixed demand system for this study will be 
parameterized. Chapter 4 will include the mixed Rotterdam demand examination for the U.S. shrimp 
market. The interpretation of estimated results will be also provided in this chapter. Finally, in Chapter 5, 
the conclusion of application of mixed demand in the U.S. shrimp market and its potential contribution to 



























2.1. Shrimp Market Studies  
The demand side of the shrimp market has been the subject of several studies. Some of these studies 
have applied traditional microeconomic theory (Cleary, 1969; Haas, et Al., 2001) while others have used a 
stated preference methodology based on Conjoint Analysis. These latter analyses have examined 
purchasing behavior in relation to preferences and attitudes (Rhodes, Greene, and Sanifer, 1990; Wirth and 
Davis, 2002; Wirth, Dugger, and Creswell, 2004; Barbier, 2004).  
Inspired by previous studies on agricultural goods, Yanagida and Tyson (1984) developed two 
dynamic equations to investigate the effects of habit formation and inventory adjustment on shrimp 
consumption. Their model uses monthly shrimp consumption data and its one month lag as dependent and 
independent variables, respectively. Other variables in the analysis include deflated retail raw headless 
shrimp price (36-42 count), deflated per capita personal income, and a dummy variable to capture 
seasonality effects in both equations. The researchers also include a stock variable in the second equation 
to capture the effect of inventory adjustments on shrimp consumption. Application of the lagged 
consumption variable in the model is used to quantify the influence of habit formation6 on current 
consumption. With the exception of per capita income and stocks characteristics, all estimated coefficients 
had theoretically consistent signs and were statistically significant. The analysis indicated that monthly 
shrimp consumption is inelastic, with respect to the monthly price in the short-run. The consumer habit has 
a significant effect on his/her consumption. As the per capita income coefficient in the shrimp demand 
equation has not only unexpected sign (negative sign) but is also statistically insignificant, the authors 
conclude that consumers prefer to consume shrimp in restaurants instead of household. 
Other researchers have developed a system of simultaneous equations model which includes both 
demand and supply functions (Gillespie, et al. 1969; Doll, 1972; Thompson and Roberts, 1982; Adam, et. 
                                                            





al. 1987; Keithly, et. al. 1993). Doll (1972) formulates a system of five simultaneous equations to build a 
structural model of the U.S. shrimp market and evaluate the impact of imports on ex-vessel prices. In this 
study, Doll composes ex-vessel prices, U.S. shrimp consumption and ending stocks as jointly determined 
variables and shrimp supplies and consumer income as predetermined/exogenous variables. He considers 
the volume of imports and the beginning stocks as alternative supply sources for the landings in the 
consumption equation. After running the system by applying annual data, he concludes that domestic (ex-
vessel) prices are significantly influenced by imports with increases in the later dampening the domestic 
price. In his study, Doll calculated the short-run and long-run multipliers: impact, cumulative, and 
equilibrium. Both the domestic landings and imports have a significant effect on the ex-vessel prices; 
however the effect of shrimp landings on domestic prices was approximately twice that of the effect of 
imports.  
Following the Doll study, Thompson and Roberts (1982) attempted to forecast ex-vessel shrimp 
prices for the Northern Gulf of Mexico. Their model included seven simultaneous equations and differs 
from the model proposed by Doll in a number of important features. Specifically, whereas Doll employed 
annual data in his analysis, Thompson and Roberts apply monthly data. Furthermore, Thompson and 
Roberts regard the quantity of shrimp landings and import quantities, as well as fishing effort, as jointly 
determined variables. As such, Thompson and Roberts treat imports as an endogenous variable, while Doll 
treats imports exogenously in his system. Analysis by Thompsonand Roberts (1982) indicates that landings, 
imports, and stocks have a significant effect on price prediction. They conclude that substitute and 
complementary goods are also important to forecasting the northern Gulf of Mexico dockside shrimp price. 
It should be noted that both of these models were conducted prior to the large increase in imports brought 
about, primarily, via increasingly. 
Adams, et. al. (1987) adopt a causal relationship model to assess the dynamic nature of price 
leadership between adjacent market levels and to determine the factors influencing the price in each market 
level. They use monthly and quarterly data for 31-40 size and 21-25 size classes of raw-headless shrimp. 




handler; and 4) producers. Prices at each level are a function of quantity demanded at that level, costs of 
marketing inputs (for the last three levels) connected to present the product to consumers, retailers, and 
wholesaler-producers, respectively, a set of consumer demand shifters for the first level (retailer), and a set 
of prices involving subsets of current or lagged dependent and pre-determined prices appropriate for a 
specific market. In this system of four equations, causal variables include imports, landings, beginning 
inventories, income, a cost index of marketing inputs, and prices of competing meat products. For the causal 
relations investigation, Adams, et. al. (1987) apply data for the period of 1968 to1981. However, due to the 
unavailability of data for quantity of shrimp, costs, and income, the researchers use data from 1972 to 1981 
for the analysis of price models. Some of their key findings of the causal analysis reveal that none of the 
mentioned market levels have an effective market power to allocate more market share to itself or to transfer 
its costs to other levels; therefore, there is no monopolistic pricing in the shrimp industry. The estimated 
price relationships demonstrate that imports and government policies can affect all market levels. Since the 
impact is almost equivalent at the wholesale and ex-vessel levels, but substantially greater at the retail level, 
the price of small size shrimp is able to adjust faster than large size shrimp prices.  
Diop, et. al. (1999) examine the role of shrimp imports on the U.S. southeastern (i.e., coastal states 
from North Carolina through Texas) shrimp processing industry. The model contains three demand 
equations for three levels of the shrimp industry: retail, wholesale, and ex-vessel. In contrast to the Adams, 
et. al. (1987), Diop, et. al. (1999) consider four forms of shrimp products (rather than two-size shrimp) in 
their investigation: headless-shell-on, peeled, breaded, and “other” shrimp. They adopt a three-stage least 
square technique and estimate the structural and reduced form equations for the observations from 1973 to 
1996. The results of their study reveal that retail demand functions are price inelastic, but that wholesale 
demand functions are price elastic except for breaded shrimp.  
Similar to the findings by Adams, et. al. (1987), results by Dio, et. al. (1999) indicate that a change 
in policy measures will impact all market levels. For example, an increased trade restriction reduces the 
available supplies which, in turn, cause prices to increase and then the wholesale processor margins will 




exceeds that at either the retail or ex-vessel level. Analysis by Adams, et. al. (1987), by comparison, 
suggests that the effect of a policy, such as increased trade restriction, on prices is greater at the retail level 
than at wholesale level or ex-vessel level. In addition to the simultaneous equations specification, 
researchers have employed Inverse Demand System (IDS) or Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System 
(IAIDS) in identifying the determinants of shrimp demand and price and income flexibilities. Employment 
of IDS and IADS are based on the premise of ad highly inelastic supply function for shrimp. for example, 
arguing that the annual domestic supply of shrimp is fixed, Houston and Nieto (1988) specified an inverse 
demand function (a price-dependent function) to study the factors affecting the distribution of fresh shrimp 
in four major U.S. producing regions including Gulf of Mexico, Florida, North Carolina, and South Atlantic.  
In an equilibrium condition the annual domestic regional shrimp prices have been expressed as a function 
of quantity of landings (own region and outside region), the quantity of net imports, the quantity of the 
carry-over stocks, and total disposable income. Formulating a system of equations for each region 
comprised of size, and species. The authors apply a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model. Their 
model includes four regions: Gulf of Mexico, Florida, North Carolina, and South Atlantic; three species: 
brown, pink, and white; and three different sizes: small, medium, and large. They estimate price flexibilities 
and the results indicate that the import impacts, the landings’ variation in the species and the size 
composition impacts, and the real disposable personal income impacts on deflated regional prices differ in 
every region. 
The most recent shrimp demand analysis is that conducted by Jones, et al. (2008). In this study, 
unlike previous investigations, a differential approach is used for analysis. The researchers apply 
Netherlands Central Bureau Statistic (CBS) specification to estimate U.S. demand for domestic and 
imported shrimp for the period of 1995 to 2005. The researchers consider eight demand equations for the 
shrimp imports and domestic product. Although, shrimp imports from six countries – Mexico, Ecuador, 
India, Thailand, Vietnam, and China – are considered in the analysis as well as an additional category for 
remaining imports from the rest of the world. These seven equations, as well as U.S. domestic production, 




approximation, the researchers estimate sixteen versions of the model based on an arrangement of the four 
dynamic and the four monthly dummy/intercept hypotheses. The results demonstrate that shrimp demand 
follows a seasonal pattern, that is, it may change from month to month, while its annual pattern is stable. 
The conditional own-price elasticity estimates for all countries were less than -1 in magnitude and were 
statistically significant. Accordingly, Jones, et. al. (2008) conclude that the demand for imported shrimp is 
inelastic. The estimated cross-price ealsticities associated with imports from the various countries were, 
with some exceptions, negative and statistically significant implying that there are complementary relations 
among imported shrimp products from the various countries. The researchers do not attempt to explain 
whether this finding conforms to economic theory. 
In chapter 1, it has been explained, in detail, that the quantity of Gulf landings has been stable for 
more than three decades; however, the price of shrimp landings has had a downward trend. Muhammad 
and Hanson (2009) explicitly explain why an inverse demand is the best specification for almost all seafood 
demand analysis. The perishable nature of seafood, especially fresh seafood, is associated with an inelastic 
short-run supply function. In this instance, Gulf of Mexico harvested shrimp (as kind of seafood) quantities 
are dockside landings which are comparatively fixed in short-run. It is the reason that almost all shrimp 
demand studies are applied inverse demand (price dependent) functions to analyze this market. It means, in 
this market, at a given quantity the price of landings should be adjusted to clear the market. 
On the other hand, as illustrated in chapter 1, there are several potential sources for the exporters 
to send their shrimp productions to a country or a region in which prices are higher, relative to other 
countries/regions. It is the reason that the U.S. imported shrimp demand is assumed to specify as quantity 
dependent function. It means to clear this market the quantity of demand should be adjusted at a given price. 
Therefore, one can easily conclude that there is not a similar relationship between the quantity and price of 
U.S. domestically harvested and imported shrimp. This study contributes to the shrimp demand literature 
by applying a new model for the U.S. shrimp market, the mixed Rotterdam demand system. In addition, the 




consumption behavior (Chavas, 1984). Consequently, the remainder of this chapter is allocated to a review 
of studies using the mixed demand specification for other agricultural goods other than shrimp. 
2.2. Mixed Demand Studies 
Some agricultural economics researchers believe for many agricultural goods being processed and 
distributed with diverse shapes and preparations, one should not consider only one specified demand 
function (Barten, 1992; Chavas, 1984; Moschini and Vissa, 1993; Moschini and Rissi, 2006 and 2007; 
Brown and Lee, 2006). That is, the fresh products which are quickly perishable and have biological, 
seasonal variation in the supply do not have the same demand function as frozen one which can last for a 
longer period of time (Samuelson, 1965; Barten, 1992; Brown, Lee, and Gao, 1993; Brown and Lee, 2006;  
Paulus, 1975; Chavas, 1984). Regular demand functions are suitable for the explanation of price and 
quantity relationship of that sub-group of goods which can be stored for the time in which the demand is 
high enough. Likewise, for the description of a quickly perishable sub-group of commodities inverse 
demand equations are more appropriate (Barten and Bettendorf, 1989). A mixed demand function is the 
one that seems to appeal to the types of agricultural commodities that have various combinations with 
different reactions in the market or industry. The mixed system concept in consumer behavioral theory was 
first introduced by Samuelson (1965). After Samuelson, Chavas (1984) and Cunha-e-Sa, and Ducla-Soares 
(1999) expand its theoretical aspects. While this concept has been used effectively as the object of market 
structure studies of several agricultural commodities such as meat/livestock products (Heien, 1977; 
Moschini and Vissa, 1993; McLaren and Gary Wong, 2009), fruits (Brown and Lee, 2006), and vegetables 
(Moschini and Rizzi, 2007; Barten, 1992), Cunha-e-Sa et al. (2004) apply this specification to develop an 
approach to test the consistency situations between travel cost and contingent valuation data. Gao, Wailes, 
and Cramer (1996) illustrate a mixed Rotterdam demand system in an empirical analysis of consumption 
of rationed and non-rationed food in China. These two latter studies have adopted the mixed demand 
concept but have used them in different meaning. All of these research papers have shown the primary 
importance of specifying a consistent method with the market structure to empirical study in demand 




function, which expresses the quantity of demand as a function of prices and consumer income, is not the 
only and inevitably the best way of the specification of demand relationships. According to the duality 
concept, an inverse demand system which illustrates the relationship between prices as dependent variable 
and quantity demanded as pre-determined variable is also, in some cases, an appropriate model for demand 
analysis. An alternative approach that is between the two other polar cases is the mixed demand system of 
equations. This method, which regards demand relationships as a function of mixed groups of quantities 
and prices, provides a more convenient way than estimating a simultaneous system of demand and supply 
equations (Moschini and Vissa, 1993). Based on consumer preference theory, a regular demand is obtained 
through the utility maximization problem. To attain an inverse demand function, one can apply a cost 
minimization problem or use Roy’s identity and Shephard’s lemma (based on duality theory). The mixed 
demand system is also accomplished by maximizing consumers’ utilities. The difference between this 
method and the two others is the presentation of direct and indirect utility functions. In a regular demand, 
a direct utility function is maximized while in an inverse demand, an indirect utility plays a role (Heien, 
1977). In a mixed demand system, both of these functions together have an essential application 
(Samuelson, 1965). A set of mixed demand equations contains the coefficients of a regular demand system 
and of an inverse demand system together (Barton, 1992).  
One of the earliest applications of mixed demand systems relates to Barten’s study of vegetables in 
1992. Barten argues that canned vegetables are common substitutes for fresh vegetables. In some seasons, 
because of biological production lags, fresh vegetables are rare in the market. During this time, the 
preserved vegetables will relatively fill the gap caused by the seasonal variation in the supply of fresh 
vegetables in the market. Therefore, Barten believes vegetables can be divided into two general groups: 
fresh and canned. By taking into account a different market adjustment for these two groups, Barten designs 
the mixed Rotterdam demand parameterization for a set of eight types of vegetables in which five types 
belong to fresh vegetables and three types are associated with canned or other preserved vegetables 
categories. However, to estimate the model’s parameters, he employs a regular Rotterdam system of 




effect in the residuals, Barten adds seasonal dummy variables to his model. The Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation approach is applied to estimate the model’s parameters over the first quarter of 1975 to last 
quarter of 1984. Barten’s estimated elasticities do not support his intuitive expectations that canned and 
other preserved vegetables are mutual substitutions for fresh vegetables, while they are statistically 
significant. He mentions that to find an answer to this problem, the Allais characterization of substitution 
and interaction needs to be used. To compare the difference between considering an endogenous nature for 
some prices rather than an exogenous one, he estimates a regular demand system where all prices are 
exogenous and all quantities are endogenous. The estimated results demonstrate that the absolute value of 
the price effects increase in the equilibrium relations when the endogenous nature of some prices is taken 
into account.  
There are also some other studies that are applied mixed demand specification for some other 
reasons rather than Barten’s description of the nature of agricultural foods. These studies include Moschini 
and Vissa (1993), Cunha-e-Sa et al. (2004), and Gao, Wailes, and Cramer (1996). 
Moschini and his colleagues, Vissa and Rissi have focused on several specifications of mixed 
demand systems, such as Rotterdam, Stone-Geary, and Normalized Quadratic models. Moschini and Vissa 
estimate a set of mixed Rotterdam demand relations for the Canadian meat industry, including beef, pork, 
and chicken, using quarterly data on consumption and prices for the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter 
of 1990. Moschini and Vissa explain why a mixed demand is an appropriate specification for the Canadian 
meat market. Canada is importing some of their beef and pork products from the United States. They believe 
that the Canadian beef and pork market are following a free trade market. In this instance, it is rational to 
take into account the prices of these two productions as pre-determined, because the beef and pork 
international trade market equilibrium assigns the prices. So, Canadian importers are price takers. In the 
chicken market, however, there is a different relationship between the quantities of supply and prices. 
Chicken producers have constituted their own organizations and have gained enough power to control the 
amount of supply in the market. Therefore, the Canadian chicken market will be cleared with the adjustment 




equations; two regular demands for beef and pork products and one inverse demand for chicken products. 
By using the mixed Rotterdam model, Moschini and Vissa estimate weighted compensated mixed 
elasticities for beef, pork, and chicken. Consuming these estimated parameters and elaborating on Slutsky 
relations, they calculate the Marshallian mixed ealsticities and direct Marshallian and direct compensated 
elasticities. Their results demonstrate that estimated mixed elasticities and estimated direct elasticities are 
the same for beef and pork, but the estimated own-price elasticity for chicken from the mixed demand is 
greater than the one which is estimated from the regular demand. 
Most of the literature about the mixed demand is devoted to mixed Rotterdam demand 
specification. Moschini and Rissi are the ones who have also worked on other specifications such as Stone-
Geary and Normalized Quadratic models. In 2006, Moschini and Rissi introduce the mixed Stone-Geary 
demand system and apply this specification for the Italian vegetables market. A more noticeable issue in 
this study is the comparison of the ordinary Stone-Geary demand system and mixed Stone-Geary demand 
system by implementing the Monte Carlo method, before deployment of the model for Italian vegetables. 
The derived results demonstrate that none of their estimated true models present bias. However, when they 
project the mixed model with the Monte Carlo true data generating process as the regular model (or vice 
versa) an essential bias appears. In this regard, they conclude that an estimation of an ordinary model when 
the true model is the mixed specification causes an “error-in-variable” problem that induces inconsistent 
estimators. Their model is fit for monthly data over the period of January 1997 to April 2004. Their variables 
include the total expenditure, quantity, and price per unit cost measure in euro/kg. They also formulate the 
normalized prices rather than the nominal one. Similar to Barten’s investigation, they divide the vegetables 
into two major groups: fresh vegetables and frozen and canned vegetables. The regular demand equations 
are made up of two frozen and canned vegetables, while inverse demand equations are made up of seven 
fresh vegetables. Therefore, their system is comprised of nine equations. To eliminate the seasonality effects 
and serial correlation in the estimated residuals, they comprise quarterly dummy variables and first-order 
serial correlation AR(1) equations, respectively. To estimate the system’s parameters, they use the 




Watson (DW), all nine individual equations are a fairly good fit. All the estimated coefficients, except one, 
are statistically significant at a 1% level. The parameter estimates for seasonality effects demonstrate that 
the Italian vegetables market follows a seasonal pattern. Similar to the Moschini and Vissa (1993) study, 
they also calculate the ordinary demand elasticities: price and income elasticities. The model’s own-price 
elasticities are all negative which indicates that the Stone-Geary regularity conditions are satisfied. The 
estimated expenditure elasticities illustrate that the demand for fresh vegetables is less elastic than frozen 
and canned products. They also approve of Moschini and Vissa’s (1993) consideration that mixed demand 
estimations illustrate more elastic demand relations than regular demand estimations. Moschini and Rissi 
have also comprised another specification of mixed demand in 2007, Normalized Quadratic mixed demand 
system. They apply the same Italian dataset as their previous study regarding to the mixed Stone-Geary 
demand system in 2006. The only difference in this study is the model specification, which is the mixed 
Normalized Quadratic demand system. They maintain a TSP software package to estimate model 
parameters. The estimated R2 and Durbin Watson illustrate that the model is fit well and the first-order 
autocorrelation equation AR(1) could carry out the system’s serial correlation. They also calculate 
Marshallian mixed elasticities, including own-price and own-quantity ealsticities, and expenditure 
elasticities at the sample mean of their corresponding variables. The own-quantity elasticities estimates for 
the price equations are one and less than one in absolute value which indicate that ordinary demand for 
vegetables is inelastic. The own-price elasticities estimates for the quantity equations state an almost 
inelastic demand for both frozen and canned vegetables. 
Moschini and Rissi project a restricted cost function, rather than a utility function, on a Stone-Geary 
specification for the first study and Normalized Quadratic for the second study to generate empirical mixed 
demand models. In both specifications of mixed demand systems, they analyze the same market at the same 
period of time. In this instance, the issue that one may expect to be answered regarding specification, Stone-
Geary and/or Normalized Quadratic, is which model is more appropriate for this kind of market/data. This 




In an extensive study, Wong and Park (2007), provide three applicable mixed demand 
specifications, Normalized Quadratic Model (NQM), Quadratic Almost Ideal Mixed Demand System 
(QAIMDS), and Nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and adopt them for the Japanese meat 
and fish consumption. These systems have been derived based on the Hicksian conditional cost function, 
as Moschini and Rissi applied for Stone-Geary and Normalized Quadratic mixed demand system. The 
obtained systems are applied to the demand for meat and fish markets using monthly data for six Japanese 
aggregated categories of fish and meat consumption. Among these six categories, three products are 
associated with the ordinary demand equations (group A) and three other are related to the inverse demand 
equations (group B). Via GAUSS software package, they adopt the full information maximum likelihood 
algorithm to estimate the parameters of their models. To eliminate the serial correlation they imposed the 
first order autocorrelation strategy in the models. Their results show that all three models are well fit. The 
likelihood estimates, Schwartz Criterion (SC), Akaike’s Information Criterion, and Likelihood Dominance 
Criterion (LDC), constructed by Pollak and Wales (1991), for the three systems indicate the superiority of 
ISNCES and QAIMDS specifications relative to NQM specification. They conclude that this outcome is 
related to the number of parameters that each model carries out. The NOM specification has more 
parameters than two other ones. In this article, Wang and Park investigate the effects of a reduction in 
predetermined variables, which are included in the group B equations on consumer welfare calculating the 
compensating variation (CV) and the equivalent variation (EV). The results indicate that a reduction in the 
meat and fish supply make Japanese consumers worse off. However, a reduction in the fish supply will 
affect consumer welfare more than a reduction in the meat supply. 
Gao, Wailes, and Cramer (1996) present a different aspect of the mixed demand system. Regarding 
the governmental control of food in China, there are two different supplies of food in some urban areas in 
this country, rationed and non-rationed goods. Partial rationed food means that consumers can buy their 
allowance of food (quota) from the government at a lower price (subsidized price) and buy the rest of their 
needed supplies from the private market at a higher price. The researchers believe that for a market that 




is more appropriate by means of being consistent with theoretical outcomes. Rationed food products 
including  pork, beef, eggs, and poultry are represented with a regular demand system of equations (price 
pre-determined), while non-rationed food including grain and edible oil are associated with an inverse 
demand system of equations (quantity pre-determined). They also consider fresh vegetables in the inverse 
demand system for the quick perishability of this product, as do other studies. The sample period covers 
January 1987 through December 1991. This study has been designed for three different specifications: a 
regular Rotterdam model, an inverse Rotterdam model, and a mixed Rotterdam model. It is also comprised 
of likelihood ratio tests, as Vuong introduced in his article (1989), to perceive which specification is more 
reliable. These tests reveal that a mixed demand system is a better specification relative to the two other 
models. Elaticities and flexibilities estimates demonstrate that income effects lead price effects. The 
government policy of rationing has a significant influence on demand for non-rationed food products. Price-
price flexibilities of demand for non-rationed food commodities with respect to rationed foods indicate that 
these two groups of products are substitute goods. The same conclusion can be obtained from quantity-
quantity elasticities of demand for rationed food with respect to non-rationed food. The authors conclude 
that these relations are theoretically consistent, since Chinese consumers will select the staple ration food 
products when the price of these foods is high in the private market. This consumer behavior causes the 
negative relations between these two groups of commodities. 
The last article which will be reviewed in this section belongs to Brown and Lee (2006), “A Mixed 
Rotterdam Model.” As mentioned, Moschini and Vissa (1993), Moschini and Rissi, (2006 and 2007), Wong 
and Park (2007) identify their mixed demand system through the conditional cost function, while in their 
study, Brown and Lee adopt Barten’s (1992) fundamental matrix equations to specify the mixed Rotterdam 
demand system. This is the approach that is also applied in this study. Their primary goal is to demonstrate 
the relationship between the mixed demand system and its related regular and inverse demand functions. 
They conclude that the regular and inverse Rotterdam demand models are special cases of the mixed 
Rotterdam demand model. Having this knowledge, one can easily impose the same utility-based restrictions 




straightforward. In the same study, they illustrate several mixed Rotterdam models with different 
restrictions in applications. To determine the effects of prices and quantities of fruits in each specification, 
Brown and Lee adopt the fruits annual data, such as per capita fresh table fruit consumption and their retail 
prices for the period from 1980 to 2000. Since all bananas and grapes consumed in the U.S. are imported, 
and fresh oranges and grapefruits consumed in the U.S are produced domestically, Brown and Lee believe 
that a mixed demand specification is appealing for this case. The two sets of demand equations considered 
in their study are: group “a,” a set of inverse demand equations that include apples/pears, bananas, and 
grapes and group “b,” a set of regular demand equations that is comprised of oranges and grapefruits. Their 
restricted mixed demand models are preference independent model block dependent model I, and block 
dependent model II. The two latter specifications are represented as level versions of mixed demand models. 
The coefficient and elasticities estimates indicate that all the coefficients for a preference independent 
model have the expected sign and are statistically significant. While the signs of all coefficients of the block 
dependent model I are the same as those for the preference independent model, the t value for several of 
the coefficients are lower in this model. The coefficients and elasticities estimates for the block dependent 
model II are similar to those for the block dependent model I, excluding the cross-group elasticity 
coefficients. A comparison between the block dependent model I and the block dependent model II reveals 
that to represent the fresh fruit demand model, one should consider some types of cross-group relationships. 
Regarding the likelihood ratio tests, they accept the block dependent model II as their final model. 
The purpose of reviewing the mixed demand studies in this section is to give the readers some 
knowledge of this specification and to show in what condition of commodities market this model is 






MIXED DEMAND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter introduces the theoretical concepts of the mixed demand theory, especially the mixed 
Rotterdam demand system. In brief, it provides details of the underlying economic theory, the prerequisite 
assumptions, and the econometric techniques applied to the model. 
In applied economics, specifically in agricultural economics, a commodity can be processed and 
marketed in several forms. This type of commodity constitutes a group of products rather than only one 
product. For example, fruits can be marketed fresh, concentrate, and/or canned. In such instance, there may 
not be a unique relationship between the price and the quantity among all types of products within the 
group. This means that not all commodities within the group behave in the same way in the market. For 
instance, some products of the group may have short-term supply making their supply functions inelastic. 
Others, though, can be preserved and may have a longer-term supply, relative to the first products, making 
their supply functions upward-sloping. When all the products of a commodity are following the same 
price/quantity relations, a regular demand or an inverse demand function will be appropriated. However, 
when there is a particular type of product in a group, as mentioned, the question arises: How can a demand 
function for this particular type of good be traced? In 1965, Samuelson responded to this question, by 
positing that a mixed demand system is the most accurate model for such a commodity. An ordinary/regular 
demand system or an inverse demand system, which are the polar cases of the demand systems, present 
only one aspect of demand behavior: either the quantities consumed are a function of prices or the prices 
are a function of quantities demanded, respectively. They are not able to respond in a more complicated 
system of demand as evidenced by the above example. However, these two models have long been favorites 
for economic researchers. A mixed demand system as a third class of demand model (Moschini and Rizzi, 
2006) is an alternative demand specification in consumer behavior theory. It is introduced by Samuelson 
(1965) and its theoretical framework is developed by Chavas (1984) and Cunha-e-Sa and Ducla-Soares 
(1999). Since this system is able to respond to both quantity and price dependent functions issues, it is 




data, which are aggregated data across households, Samuelson’s mixed demand functions are not only  
proper specifications, but also provide a theoretical basis for this type of study (Chavas, 1984).   
The mixed demand system of equations, like ordinary demand functions, can also be derived from 
the consumer utility maximization problem. The mixed set of demand functions contains both coefficients 
of an ordinary7 demand system and of an inverse demand system (Barton, 1992). In the case of driving a 
mixed demand system, one needs to specify a mixed utility function. Samuleson believes this mixed model 
is neither a direct utility nor an indirect utility function, but holds the more general property of comprising 
both quantities and prices (Samuelson, 1965). Samuelson has named “a new fundamental function of both 
x’s and y’s” (x is the quantity of demand and y is the normalized price), the mixed utility function can be 
written as follows: 
)Y()X(withU),Y()Y(and)X(    or )Y()X(U     (3.1) 
where the functions )X( , direct utility, and )Y( , indirect utility, are dual functions. Therefore, the 
function “U” is a function of either the quantity set or the relative price set. In his paper, Samuelson explains 
that to obtain such a function: 1) a utility function should satisfy the regularity assumptions; 2) s'xi  are 
nonnegative; 3) a utility function )x,...,x,x()X(U n21   is a strictly convex set in the X space and 
a strictly monotonic increasing function of each of its arguments; 4) this utility function should be 
continuously twice differentiable; 5) and this utility function, )X( , should have fewer utility if  any good 
is zero than any set of utility )Z(  when all goods are positive. 
),y...,y,y,...,y()x,...,x,x,...,x()y,y;x,x(U)Y;X(U bm1ban1abm1ban1ababa     (3.2a) 
i=1,2,…,n  and  j=1,2,…,m  
or 
),y...,y,y,...,y()x,...,x,x,...,x()y,y;x,x(U)Y;X(U bm1ban1abm1ban1ababa     (3.2b) 
                                                            
7 As explained, an ordinary or a regular demand, known as Marshallian demand, is a function that the quantity of 




i=1,2,…,n and  j=1,2,…,m.   
He states that by applying the negative sign for the indirect utility function, one is able to maximize 
the mixed utility function appreciating perfect symmetry property of direct and indirect utility functions. In 
a mixed utility function (equations 3.2), two special cases are expected. One will have a set of pure 
quantities if 0j  , whereas one will have a set of pure prices if 0i  (Samuelson, 1965). The latter case 
demonstrates a direct utility function while and the former illustrates an indirect utility function. To find 
the set of all n equilibrium points, one should maximize a total space of 2n-dimension of )y,x( bjai , with 
respect to 1XY  , where i=1, 2, …, n and j=1, 2, .., m (Samuelson, 1965). 
0)y,y,x,x(MaxU
)y,x(
         (3.3) 
 .t.s           1XY  . 
By solving this optimization problem, two sets of the mixed demand will be obtained. The first 




ai   )n,...,1i(        (3.4a) 
)x,...,x;y,...,y(yy bm1ban1a
j
bj   )m,...,1j(  .      (3.4b) 
The term aix shows the quantity of good i which is the function of its own price, all other goods’ prices, 
and the quantities of commodities that belong to the second subgroup. The term in the left hand side of the 
second system of equations, bjy , illustrates the price of good i which is the function of the first subgroup’s 
goods’ prices, its own quantity, and the quantities of all other commodities that belong to the second 
subgroup.  
A mixed demand system of equations has a close relationship with a conditional/rationed demand 
function (Chavas, 1984). Conditional demand functions have been illustrated with some applications to 




environmental goods and services (Cornes, 1980; Gueonerie, 1981), and the analysis of the impacts of 
leisure on consumption (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The major difference between the mixed demand 
system and conditional/rationed demand system is that the market is not reaching to equilibrium points for 
all commodities when one applies the conditional demand system. For instance, consider that some goods 
are distributed as quotas in a society, meaning that, their allocation is independent of the market mechanism. 
Every individual has a fixed allotment and is not allowed to sell his/her quota. There is also not any addition 
of these products in the market. Accordingly, one can divide all commodities into two subgroups. The first 
group of products is allocated through the market mechanism, Q , and the second part is pre-allocated, *Q
. Then the individual preference can be associated with an ordinal utility function (Pollak, 1969). In this 
illustration, the utility function can be written as follows: 
),...,,( 21 nqqqU .          
To obtain the demand function through a utility maximization function, an additional constraint 







         (3.5a) 
*
ii qq    ,Qi
*          (3.5b) 
where M denotes the total expenditure on goods which are available in the market. The equation (2b) 
demonstrates the condition of the commodities subject to quota. After maximizing the utility function 





          (3.6) 
where qP is the vector of market goods’ prices and 
*Q , as mentioned above, is the vector of pre-allocated 
commodities. The individual conditional demand function will hold all fundamental assumptions of an 
ordinary demand function, as long as the individual quota is fixed (Pollak, 1969). The conditional utility 









As evident, only market goods are involved in the optimization process and only market goods are 
participating in the budget constraint (equation 3.5a). In other words, only these commodities are consumed 
in an optimal point while the rationed commodities may not be. This is not the case in the mixed utility 
optimization process which will be explained in detail later in this chapter. In a mixed demand system, all 
goods are participating in the market mechanism to be allocated in the optimum way. 
The mixed demand system can be proposed for the rationed goods if there is partial rationing in the 
society. The case illustrated here is an example of strict rationing. The difference between partial rationing 
and strict rationing is that, with strict rationing, consumers are not allowed to buy rationed goods 
(allotments) from the market, mentioned as one of the assumptions in the previous example. Partial 
rationing can be a subject for the mixed demand study (Gao et al., 1996), since consumers are not only able 
to buy rationed goods/quotas from the government’s distribution system at a lower price, but are also able 
to buy extra provisions from the competitive market at a higher price. Accordingly, rationed goods are 
interacting in two different ways in the market; some part of their quantity is pre-determined and the 
government distribution system adjusts the price rather than market, while the remainder is of price pre-
determined that participates in the market mechanism along all other non-rationed goods. For the price pre-
determined part, the market will be cleared by adjusting the quantity. Gao et al. (1996) apply a mixed 
demand specification for the Chinese urban household by considering these assumptions. They deliberate 
an inverse demand system for the rationed part of the commodity and appreciate a regular demand system 
for the non-rationed part.  
3.1. Mixed Demand Specification 
Like a regular demand, a mixed demand system can be obtained through the utility maximization 
problem. The difference between a mixed utility function and a direct or indirect utility function is that a 
mixed utility function comprises the variables of both of these utility functions instead of only one. As 
indicated, in this instant, a mixed utility function is more flexible than a direct utility function which only 




Although the numbers of studies that have applied this model are rare, the variety of specifications 
used in these studies has been comparatively high. Mocshini and Vissa (1993), Moschini and Rissi (2006, 
2007), and Wong and Park (2007) have obtained an empirical model for the mixed demand through the 
conditional cost function. Mixed Rotterdam Demand System, Stone-Geary Mixed Demand System, 
Normalized-Quadratic Mixed Demand System, Quadratic Almost Ideal Mixed Demand System 
(QAIMDS), and Nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (NCES) are some examples of models that have 
been derived from this technique. Brown et al. (1993), Brown and Lee (2006), and Gao et al. (1996) 
parameterize this model via the primary utility functional form as Samuelson and Chavas analysis. The 
mixed Rotterdam demand system has been obtained by applying this method. Moschini and Vissa (1993, 
2006) posit that neither a Flexible Functional Forms (FFFs) for the indirect utility functions will have a 
closed-form solution for the direct utility functions nor a more restricted representation of preferences will 
be able to implement a more straightforward way to obtain consistent estimations than the optimality 
condition equations. To parameterize an estimable mixed demand system, in addition to a decent knowledge 
of both direct utility and indirect utility function, a functional form with a closed form dual representation 
is needed (Samuelson, 1965; Chavas, 1984; Moschini, 1993). According to consumer demand theory, cost 
functions, indifference curves and utility functions should hold some properties to derive a demand 
function. After that parameters of such a demand system can be estimated. If these properties are satisfied, 
one can also apply the derivative properties to benefit from the existing relationship among equations of a 
demand system. If the observable variables for a direct utility function are available, which means the 
parameters of such a function can be defined through a consistent functional form by applying Hotelling-
Wold’s Identity, one is able to trace an inverse demand function. All other forms of demand systems can 
be derived through other identities and lemmas. The differential demand approach is able to satisfy all these 
properties. This approach does not need any algebraic specification of a direct utility function, an indirect 
utility function, or a cost function. The coefficients of the demand system that can be derived from this 





This study adopts the Brown and Lee parameterization (2006) to obtain the mixed demand system 
after deriving the general demand system through the differential approach. This model is known as the 
mixed Rotterdam demand system. Like a regular demand, a mixed demand system can also be achieved 
through the optimization problem: 
Max
ba pq ,
 )M,p,p(v)q,q(u)y,p,p,q,q(z babababa      (3.8a) 
   .t.s   Mqpqp bbaa          (3.8b)  
where the u(.) and v(.) are the direct and indirect utility functions, respectively; ap   and bp are vectors of 
prices for the commodity group a and b, respectively; and aq and bq are the vectors of quantities consumed 
for the commodity group a and b, respectively. Consequently, the mixed utility function, z, is a monotonic 
increasing function of its arguments (Barten, 1989). By applying the Lagrangian expression, the optimum 
prices and quantities will be attained at the point at which the first order conditions equal zero, 
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where  is the Lagrangian multiplier. This system includes “n+m+1” equations and unknown parameters; 
n equation belongs to (3.5a), m equations are related to (3.5b), and the last equation is the budget constraint 
(3.5c). Conditioning on the budget constraint, these “n+m+1” equations, obtained from first derivative of 
optimization/maximization of Lagrangian expression (equation 3.4), insure that the utility function is 
stationary. The second order condition, which is the second derivative of the optimization problem, 
guarantees that the stationary value is a maximum (Theil, 1975). After solving these three equations 
simultaneously, the result will be a mixed demand system: 
)M,q,p(qq baa
*
a            (3.11a) 
)M,q,p(pp bab
*
b            (3.11b) 
)M,q,p( ba  .          (3.11c) 
 Equations (3.11a) and (3.11b) are the Marshallian mixed demands. Comparing a regular demand 
system and an inverse demand system with above mentioned equations (3.8) indicates that these two former 
equations are extreme cases of the mixed demand system. When all prices are exogenous, the equations 
(3.8) change to an optimization problem for a conditional regular demand system, and when all quantities 
are exogenous, the equations (3.8) becomes an optimization problem for a conditional inverse demand 
system of equations (Brown and Lee, 2006). In other words, the equations (3.11a) and (3.11c) are the first 
order condition for a conditional regular/ordinary demand system, and equations (3.11b) and (3.11c) are 
the first order condition for a conditional inverse demand system (Brown and Lee, 2006). This mixed 
demand system, which is obtained from the constrained optimization approach, like a direct utility 
maximization problem, satisfies the classic restrictions of consumer behavior theory. The budget restriction 
in the model meets the adding up property. As both ordinary/regular and inverse demand systems are 
satisfying the homogeneity condition, the regular demand function  )M,q,p(qq baa
*   is homogeneous 
of degree zero in ap  and M, and the inverse demand function, )M,q,p(pp bab
*




of degree zero in ap  and M (Mocshini and Vissa, 1993). The mixed utility function, z(.), now can be written 
as follow: 
)]M,q,p(p,p[v]q),M,q,p(q[u)M,p,q(z bababbaaab
M  .    (3.12) 
3.2. Mixed Rotterdam Demand Parameterization 
As mentioned in previous sections, to apply the mixed demand system for the practical 
determination with observed variables, one needs a dual flexible representation of preferences, since the 
solutions of optimality conditions (equations 3.10) are not feasible as general representations of preferences 
(Mocshini and Rizzi, 2007). 
Following Brown and Lee, this study applies a log differential mixed demand system, known as 
mixed Rotterdam specification, to parameterize the demand function. To obtain the final parameterizations, 
the following steps should be taken. First a total differentiation of the mixed demands (3.11a) and (3.11b) 




















































 .         (3.13c) 
To simplify the form of the equations, the terms ap and bq are changed to ap and bq , respectively, 
while they still mean as exogenous variables. In the second step, the total differentiations of the first order 




















































dMdpqdqpdpqdqp bbbbbaaa  .       (3.14c) 
The two first equations can be rewritten as follows: 
 dpdpdqUdqU aababaaa          (3.15a) 
 dqdqdpVdpV bbaabbbb          (3.15b) 
where aaU , abU , bbV , and abV are the Hessian matrices. Rearranging these equations provides the new 
equations. 
 dpdqUdpdqU ababaaaa          (3.16a) 
 dqdpVdqdpV baabbbbb          (3.16b) 

















  .       (3.17b) 
Then, after some manipulations, the following equations will be the differential mixed demand 






































































































   . In this system of equations, adq
and bdp are endogenous variables that are determined in the market with any changes in exogenous 
variables, adp and bdq . Brown and Lee (2006) have proven that this functional form satisfies the adding 




satisfied, the equations (3.18) are recalled. The equation (3.18a) will be multiplied by the transpose matrix 























































































Adding equations (19) and rearranging, the new equation terminates to: 
,dMdqpdpqdpqdqp bbbbaaaa          (3.20) 
this equation is exactly the total differentiation of the budget constraint, which proves the adding up 
condition for the mixed Rotterdam demand system. In order to apply this system (equations 3.19), a more 
compact system with the less parameters to be estimated is needed. Brown and Lee (2006) obtain this 
































































































































































































































 are diagonal matrices in which their diagonal elements are the elements of the vectors
aq , bq , ap , and bp , and their off diagonal elements equal  zero (Brown and Lee, 2006). The final 
equations, which provide more intuitive and adequate parameters, are given below: 
     







absijiijiaiai ,Dq)UU(Dp)V(DQDqw   (3.22a) 
    









rsrbrbr .Dq)U(Dp)VV(DQDpw   (3.22b) 
The subscripts i and j stand for the elements (quantities or prices) of the commodity group “a” and 
subscripts r and s represent the elements of the commodity group “b.” The terms aiw  and brw  on the left 
hand sides are the budget shares for the two commodity groups “a” and “b,” respectively. For instance, the 














w  .        (3.23b) 
The dependent variables (left hand side variables) for the regular demand and inverse demand equations 
are the quantity components of a change in budget share, idw , and price components of idw , respectively 
(Theil, 1987).  
M
qp



































i         (3.24c) 
)M(logdw)q(logdw)p(logdwdw iiiiii  .      (3.24d) 
Equation (3.24d) implies that a change in the budget share of ith good is associated with the three 




income. As indicated, the price component and quantity component of the change in budget share are 
considered dependent variables in the mixed Rotterdam demand model. However, the quantity part is a 
dependent variable for an ordinary Rotterdam demand, and price part is a dependent variable for an inverse 
Rotterdam demand specification. In his 1987 book, Applied Demand Analysis, Theil calls the coefficients 




































  refer to the marginal budget shares (Theil, 1987) 
for the commodity group “a” and “b,” while, as mentioned before, the expressions 
M
qp
w aiaiai   and 
M
qp
w brbrbr  are the commodity group a and b’s budget shares, respectively.  Likewise, Brown and Lee 
(2006) have named these two terms as income and scale coefficients. For instance, the term i means that 
the consumer will spend i dollar on the good “i” in commodity group “a,” if his/her income increases by 































 ,   (3.26) 
where ai is the income elasticity. Therefore the coefficient i  is also the product of budget share and 





   means that the income elasticity equals the ratio 
of the marginal share to its respective budget share (Theil, 1987). The same interpretation can be applied 
for the coefficient r . Regarding the consumer behavior theory, for a normal good, the income coefficients,




In a regular Rotterdam demand system, which was introduced by Theil (1987) the DQ is a finite-
change version of the Divisia volume/quantity index. In an inverse Rotterdam demand system the DQ is a 
finite-change version of the Divisia price index (Barten and Bettendorf, 1989). However, the DQ for a 
mixed Rotterdam demand stands for the sum of both Divisia volume and Divisia price indices. Theil 
indicates that a decomposition of the change in income results in the sum of Divisia volume index and 
Divisia price index. In this study, the Divisia volume index represents a weighted average, i.e. budget 
shares, of the logarithmic quantity changes of n goods in the commodity group “a.” In the same manner, 
the Divisia price index is a budget-share weighted average of the logarithmic price changes of the m goods 
in the commodity group “b.” The Divisia price index determines the income effect on the demand for 



















































This equation is the nominal price version of both the Divisia volume and the Divisia price indices. The 





















































































































































.         (3.28m) 













is positive (Theil, 1987). 
According to Theil’s (1987), the term   for a regular differential demand, such as the regular Rotterdam 




























The reason that aab    is that in a regular differential demand all prices are exogenous and there 
is only one commodity group. Since a mixed differential demand model includes more than one group of 
commodities (and, in this investigation two groups of goods), ab will consist of the exogenous variables 






          (3.28p) 
Finally, the two terms js*abU and
sj*











1 VpVq              (3.28r) 
In equations (3.22a and 3.22b), coefficients i , s , , js*abU , and sj*abV  are considered constants to be 
estimated. This system of mixed demand should hold some properties such as adding up, symmetry, 
homogeneity, and negativity conditions, and possession of these properties allows the model parameters to 
be estimated. To show that the present model in this study accommodates the adding up property, the 





aiai           (3.29) 
If one adds up equations (3.22) over “i” in commodity group “a” and over “r” in commodity group 









aiai          (3.30a) 




ibrrsaiai DQ)(DqwDpw        (3.30b) 
  
i r








i   . Equation (3.30c), provided above, can also be attained from the budget share 
constraint. Returning to the maximization problem, the budget constraint is presented as: 
,Mqpqp bbaa            (3.31) 
the total differential of this constraint demonstrates the adding-up restriction: 
dMdpqdqpdpqdqp bbbbaaaa  .       (3.32) 
Dividing both sides of the equation (3.32) by M and multiplying each part of the left hand side by 





































      (3.33a)




brrsaiai DpwDqwDMDqwDpw ,     (3.33b) 
as shown above, DQDpwDqwDM
i r






ai  ,        (3.34) 
which is equation (3.27). 
Applying the normalized coefficients imposes the homogeneity condition. The symmetry condition 
is satisfied by jiij    and srrs   which is constituted from the symmetry property of second partial 
derivatives matrices of the utility functions. 
3.2.1 Mixed Rotterdam Demand under Preference Independence Assumption 
The Rotterdam demand system that has been discussed so far has no restriction on consumers’ 
utility functions. That is, the marginal utility of consumption of any goods, for example good i, is dependent 
on the consumption of good j, where i≠ j. Theil (1987) deliberates that the utility a consumer gains from 
consuming one commodity can be independent of consuming any  other goods. In this situation, the total 









           (3.35) 
where n is the number of the commodity which is consumed. This functional form is based on Preference 
Independence Assumption. That is, the marginal utility of consuming good i is independent of the 
consumption of good j, where i≠ j. Considering this restriction only for commodities within group a and 
group b, and not for commodities between these two groups, yields a preference independency for the direct 










aiba    .        (3.36b) 
This restriction cause the cross-group coefficients, sj*abV and
js
abU
* , in equations (3.21), to be zero. 
The presented mixed Rotterdam demand system will be changed as follows: 
     












jajiiaiai )DqDpDp(DQDqw       (3.37a) 
    














jbrrrbrbr DqDpDqDQDpw    ,     (3.37b) 
where js*abU and 
sj*
abV equal zero. All steps of these processes are shown in appendix I. 
3.2.2. Mixed Rotterdam Demand Elasticity 
Elasticity is an important concept in consumer choice theory. In many investigations the 
interpretation of elasticity estimates are more important than coefficient estimates. In general, the elasticity 
is expressed as a degree of the responsiveness of a function to change(s) in parameter(s). For a regular 




the income elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in demand 
































 .  (3.38) 
Income elasticity of demand is the percentage change in the quantity of demand as a result of a 1% 




  .           (3.39) 
Flexibility consideration is described in the same way as elasticity, but elasticity is used for regular 
demand while flexibility consideration is used for inverse (Hicksian) demand functions. However, these 
two concepts are not reciprocals of each other, except in certain conditions (Houck, 1965). Huang (2006) 
states the price flexibilities are theoretically the inverse of the price elasticities, but are not inverses of one 
another statistically. A mixed demand system of equations contains both regular and inverse demand 
equations; therefore, both elasticity and flexibility measurements are in consideration in this study. As 
explained in previous sections, the mixed Rotterdam demand specification’s variables are in form of log 
changes. This characteristic makes the computation of elasticities and flexibilities straightforward. It is 
important to mention that in a mixed demand system of equations, independent variables include prices and 
quantities, rather than containing only prices or quantities. In this instance, the elasticities for regular 
demand equations consist of elasticity of prices and quantities. The inverse demand equations also comprise 
price and quantity flexibilities. To drive the elasticity and flexibility of demand for the equations (3.37), the 
following steps must be performed: 









jajaiiaiiai       (3.40) 












jbrbrrbrrbr       (3.42) 
At this step, there are two different approaches to define elasticity. One can consider DQ as a 
variable (Brown and Lee, 2006) or assume that it is constant (Theil, 1987). This study follows Theil’s 
definition, which assumes DQ is constant. Accordingly, the price and quantity elasticities and flexibilities 
of demand for the group a and b commodities are as follows: 














ai       (3.41a) 










ai          (3.41b) 










ai          (3.41c) 










br   ,       (3.43a) 










br   ,      (3.43b) 










br   .       (3.43c) 
The income and scale elasticities/flexibilities for both commodity groups a and b are also taken into account. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the income elasticity equals the ratio of the marginal share to its 









             (3.44) 
However, Brown and Lee (2006) have defined the income elasticities for both commodity groups in 
different ways. It seems their formulation is more related to a degree of change in a selected country imports 
with respect to the imports bundle price change, rather than as income and quantity (for inverse equations 
income and price) responsiveness. Therefore, in this study the income elasticity and flexibility for both 












            (3.45b) 
The adding up constraint in the mixed Rotterdam demand model means that consumers are spending all of 
the proportion of their income allocated for shrimp products on these productions. In other words, they do 
not save or allocate some of this proportion for other purposes.  A mathematical illustration of this condition 
states that the sum of all shrimp products’ marginal shares for a consumer should be equal to one. The 
mixed Rotterdam model is associated with two marginal share coefficients; one for regular demand 
equations ( i ) and another for the inverse demand equations (- r ). Therefore, the following statement 





i    .         (3.46) 



























aiai        (3.47c) 
The income elasticity can be positive or negative. A positive income elasticity of demand means 
that there is a direct relation between a consumer’s income and her/his quantity of demand. In other words, 
as income increases the quantity of demand also increases. A negative income elasticity of demand implies 
that an increase in income will lead to a decrease in consumption (quantity of demand), an inverse relation. 
These types of goods are refers to as inferior. For a normal good, the income elasticity of demand will be 
between zero and one. However an income elasticity of demand greater than one is associated with luxuries.  








 .         (3.48b) 
In this study, the income elasticity of regular demand presents the relationship between the U.S. 
income/expenditure on shrimp products and the quantity of imports from each country, separately, as they 
are the endogenous variables for the regular demand equations. Income elasticities of the inverse demand 
equations are implying the relationships between the American income/expenditure and the Gulf dockside 
prices. In contrast, the scale flexibility, which is called scale elasticity in mixed demand, only demonstrates 
the scale expansion of an increase in income. So a proportion of consumption will be held constant in this 
estimation. These two elasticity demonstrations are described below. This shows the effect of a change in 
income on the consumption of two goods, q1 and q2. At point q1 the consumer is at an optimal point and 
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Figure 3.1. Income Elasticity and Scale Flexibility of Demand. 
 
When income increases the consumer will consume more of both goods and his/her  new optimal 
point changes. Now he/she consumes q11 and q21 of each good. He/she is going from point q0 to q1.  The 
effect of income is associated with two changes: a move from q0 to qb and a move from qb to q1. A move 
from q0 to qb illustrates the scale expansion, while a move from qb to q1 shows the proportion change.  But 
for infinite changes we show the effect of an increase in income from “q0” to “aq0” and from “aq0” to “q1.” 
For the infinitesimal changes the difference between these two decompositions can be negligible.  
Therefore, the income elasticity demonstrates both effects, from “q0” to “aq0” and from “aq0” to “q1,” while 
the scale elasticity only shows the effect of scale expansion that moves from one preference indifference 
curve to another one, from q0 to aq0 (Park and Thurman, 1999). The substitution effect is the move along 
the same indifference curve, from “aq0” to “q1.” In practice, it can be shown as a move from “q0” to “aq0” 




In only one condition, scale effect and proportion effect, which show the difference between scale 
elasticity and income elasticity, will be equal when the preferences are homothetic. This is illustrated below. 
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Figure 3.2. Income Elasticity and Scale Flexibility of Demand for Homothetic Preferences. 
 
3.3. Mixed Rotterdam Demand Econometrics Model 
To come to any expected quantitative results, an econometric specification of the mixed Rotterdam 
demand system that was introduced in the previous section is needed. Theil (1987) posits that the Rotterdam 
demand system is a finite-change version of a differential demand system which is in terms of infinitesimal 
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is noticeable that DQin Theil’s equation differs from DQ introduced in equations (3.27), since Theil’s 
system of equations represents a regular Rotterdam demand system while this paper is concentrated on the 
mixed Rotterdam demand system. Therefore, the equations below are empirical applications, in the form 
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where the subscripts t imply to the Theil’s definitions. That is, a discrete changes from period t-1 to t. The 
terms aitw  and brtw  are the arithmetic average of 1, taiw and taiw , and 1, tbrw and tbrw , , respectively. The 
disturbance terms, ait and brt are represented as the stochastic process of the econometric model. All other 





















EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the mixed Rotterdam demand system has been adopted to 
analyze the determinants of the U.S. shrimp industry. In this study, it is believed that the U.S. shrimp 
market’s structure consists of two subsystems of equations which are known as reduced form equations 
(Barten, 1992). 
In general, two different shrimp products are supplied in the U.S. market; domestically produced 
shrimp and imported shrimps. As indicated, the Gulf of Mexico produces more than 80% of the domestic 
shrimp productions. Historical data illustrates that the volume of Gulf landings has been almost constant 
during the last decades. In this condition, it is assumed that the equilibrium should be characterized by 
predetermined quantities with prices adjusting to clear the market (Moschini 1993). An inverse demand 
system is a typical representative of this market. 
In contrast, the supply of imported shrimp has increased every year since the 1980s. There are three 
major shrimp importers in the international market: Japan, United States of America, and the European 
Union (FAO, 2009). Japan, U.S., and EU have consumed 25%, 48%, and 17% of the world frozen cultured 
shrimp exports in the early 2000s, respectively, which is a total of more than 90 percent of the world’s 
farming shrimp exports (FAO, 2009). The farming shrimp producers are flexible to export their productions 
to the country/countries in which the prices are higher. The historical data illustrates that whenever a 
country imposes some regulations to import the shrimp products, the farming shrimp producers are 
diverting their exports from this county to other countries in which there are no or less restrictions. As an 
example, Cato and Santos’s 2000 study demonstrates that Bangladesh could reduce the cost of the EU ban 
on its farmed shrimp producers by reallocating a large part of their productions toward the U.S. and Japan. 
In this instance, the farming cultured shrimp exporters are gaining advantage from shrimp market flexibility 
among these three major international exports markets. In such a condition, it is believed that, with a given 
set of prices, the quantities are adjusted to clear the market (Barten, 1989). While the domestic shrimp 




appropriate model for this market, which consists of polar forms, regular and inverse demand systems. This 
study preforms a Rotterdam specification for the mixed demand system. The detailed explanation of the 
model, its application, and results are presented in this chapter as follows. First, data descriptions are 
presented. Next, the precision of the ITSUR technique and adequacy of the parameter estimates under this 
method are introduced. In the final section, the interpretation of parameter and elasticity estimates is 
considered. 
4.1. Data 
The mixed Rotterdam demand system is estimated using time series data for U.S. shrimp imports 
and Gulf of Mexico shrimp landings quantities and prices. Imports raw data have been gathered form the 
National Marine Fisheries Statistics (NMFS) website. Raw data for Gulf of Mexico shrimp landings have 
been provided directly from NMFS. The data for U.S. imports consist of eight countries including Thailand, 
Vietnam, China, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, Mexico, and a final category includes all other exporter 
countries. Demand for Gulf shrimp are specified by size of shrimp with three sizes (large, medium, and 
small) considered. 
National Marine Fisheries Statistics reports the quantities of imports by product forms and countries 
in kilogram measurement. To be compared, the quantities of imports were adjusted to the headless shell-on 
volume applying convergence criteria reported in NMFS annual statistics reports. Then the kilogram 
volumes are converted to the pound volumes by dividing 0.453592. The NMFS Gulf of Mexico raw data 
for shrimp landings are also reported in the eight sizes which are aggregated to the three sizes, representing 
large, medium, and small sizes, by adding the first three sizes, then second three sizes, and then last two 
sizes together. To have the price per pound, the dollar values in both shrimp imports and landings reports 
are divided by the pound volumes. The U.S. imports from the various countries are modeled in a quantity 
dependent framework, while, the Gulf of Mexico landings has been modeled in a price dependent 
framework. The data stand for 1995(1) and ends for 2010(4). Appendix II illustrates the model variables 




The properties of the data are shown in the next two tables. Table 4.1 illustrates the summary 
statistics for the U.S. shrimp imports and Gulf landings. Table (4.2) demonstrates the quantity component 
share of each country and landings in total expenditure over the period of study.  
          
          Table 4.1. U.S. Shrimp Imports and Gulf of Mexico Landings Summary  
          Statistics, 1995(1)-2010(4). 










Chi_PO 183 8.43 7.93 0.36 36.46 
Ecu_PO 183 9.45 3.60 2.66 16.99 
Indi_PO 183 6.25 2.87 2.05 17.30 
Indo_PO 183 7.97 6.27 0.61 25.27 
Mex_PO 183 6.06 5.83 0.12 25.56 
Thi_PO 183 38.88 17.96 9.85 83.7 
Vie_PO 183 7.25 6.09 0.04 22.79 
Other_PO 183 22.10 8.54 9.67 61.03 
L1_PO 183 2.40 1.48 0.40 6.86 
L2_PO 183 3.06 2.64 0.44 14.24 
L3_PO 183 6.46 5.72 0.36 25.13 
 
          Table 4.2. U.S. Shrimp Imports and Gulf of Mexico Landings Share 
          In Total Income and their Summary Statistics, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
Variable N % Share Std Dev % Min % Max 
W_Chi 183 4.65 0.035 0.37 16.55 
W_Ecu 183 9.76 0.061 1.67 28.87 
W_Indi 183 5.74 0.028 1.61 14.33 
W_Indo 183 7.23 0.046 0.91 22.25 
W_Mex 183 8.08 0.061 0.23 23.47 
W_Thai 183 28.57 0.055 10.91 42.06 
W_Vie 183 7.25 0.049 0.13 17.04 
W_Other 183 18.63 0.059 6.29 42.53 
W_L1 183 3.62 0.014 0.92 07.14 
W_L2 183 2.86 0.019 0.45 11.44 






As table 4.2 shows, Thailand is associated with (28.57%), the highest percent quantity component 
share in the budget share changes through the first month of 1995 to April 2010. The total quantity 
component share of the seven countries named in this study is 78.53%, which is more than four times the 
sum of all Other Countries share (18.63%), which are not included in this model directly. The U.S. domestic 
shrimp products component shares, Gulf landings, are only 10.09% which is the least quantity component 
share.  
4.2. Model Accuracy, Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Method 
A general Rotterdam mixed demand system is introduced in the literature review and methodology 
sections. As previously mentioned, to apply such a system some restrictions should be imposed; adding-
up, homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions are some examples. The system of equations that comprises 
this study also contains two more constraints along with all other restrictions. Those two limitations include 
the preference independence condition in both direct and indirect utility functions (Brown and Lee, 2006). 










jbrrrbrbr    .     (4.2) 
 
For empirical application purpose for the U.S. shrimp market demand, the mixed Rotterdam system 
is composed of eleven equations. As the mixed Rotterdam specification requires imposing adding up 
restriction in the data, to avoid having singularity problem for the contemporaneous error covariance matrix, 
the last equation which is demand equation for the Gulf small size shrimp, L3, randomly, is excluded prior 
to estimation. The estimates of the parameters are invariant to the deleted equation. The Gulf small size 
shrimp demand parameter can be obtained by applying an adding-up restriction or re-estimating the system 
by dropping a different equation, randomly. 
 Dependent variables for the first group of equations of this system (group equations 4.1), which 




of quantity of imports. The dependent variables for the second group of equations (group equations 4.2), 
which are the price component of the change in budget share, are the budget share times  the log difference 
of domestic landings’ prices. The log difference of quantities and prices are comprised as the finite-change 
of the differential demand system. It is assumed that for infinitesimal changes a differential approach 
(continuous change) and an arithmetic difference (discrete change) almost result in the same way. To 
estimate this system of equations’ parameters an Iterated Seemingly Unrelated technic is adopted using the 
SAS software package.  
Primary to the estimation process, two conditions should have been taken into account. As common 
in most time series analyses, the serial correlation and seasonality problems in the estimated residuals are 
being concerned. The imports and landings data are displayed seasonality patterns, so that the monthly data 
eleven seasonal dummy variables are comprised in every equation of the system. The last month’s 
(December) dummy variable has been dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap, the full correlation matrix 
of variables. To detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals from the regression analysis the t-
test are applied. For the t statistic test, each equation of the model is first estimated by OLS (equation by 
equation); next, OLS residuals, obtained from the first step are regressed on all exogenous variables and 
the first and second lagged residuals ( 1tu  and 2tu  ). The parameters of these equations ( 1 and 2  ) are 
the coefficients of the autoregressive equations (4.3). Therefore, the t statistics of these parameters ( 1 and 
2  ) are equivalent to the t statistics for the coefficient estimates of the autoregressive equations. 
t2t21t1t euuu             (4.3a) 
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.          (4.3b) 
 
The t-statistics demonstrate that some equations suffer from first order autocorrelation. The 
advantage of this technique is that it allows one to detect the serial correlation problem even in models in 
that use non-strictly exogenous explanatory variables (Wooldrige, 2008). Along with this method, a Durbin 




this model, since the DQ is considered as constant (Theil, 1987) in the Rotterdam specification. Therefore, 





















 (for t and k-1 d.f.)       (4.4) 
where T is the number of periods/observations and tt yye
 . For each equation of the mixed Rotterdam 
demand system, a null hypothesis test, implying the error terms are not serially correlated is constructed 
against the alternative that indicates they follow a first order autocorrelation process. The DW tests results 
are shown a first order autocorrelation in some demand equations of the system, as t-test statistic results 
constructed above are revealed. After considering AR(1) correction process for all demand equations in the 
same manner, in addition to a trend variable, the second round Durbin Watson test has been illustrated an 
acceptable results, as shown below.  
          
         Table 4.3. Test Statistics of Serial Correlation for Mixed Rotterdam Demand 
         System. 
 DF DF   Root Durbin 
Equation Model Error SSE MSE MSE Watson 
WdC_PO 15.1 167.9 0.0502 0.0003 0.0173 1.49 
WdE_PO 15.1 167.9 0.0595 0.0004 0.0188 2.28 
WdIi_PO 15.1 167.9 0.0419 0.0003 0.0158 1.95 
WdIo_PO 15.1 167.9 0.0385 0.0002 0.0151 2.36 
WdM_PO 15.1 167.9 0.1670 0.0010 0.0315 2.05 
WdT_PO 15.1 167.9 0.2103 0.0013 0.0354 2.09 
WdV_PO 15.1 167.9 0.0763 0.0005 0.0213 1.93 
WdO_PO 15.1 167.9 0.1382 0.0008 0.0287 1.90 
WdL1_PPP 15.1 167.9 0.0004 0.0000 0.0016 1.75 
WdL2_PPP 14.1 168.9 0.0006 0.0000 0.0019 1.76 
Durbin Watson lower and upper bounds of critical value, Ld and Ud , for the number of variables 
equal to 20 and 150 degrees of freedom at a 5% level of significant are 1.443 and 2.040, respectively. To 




comparison of Durbin Watson statistic estimations and critical values illustrate that only the Ecuador and 
Indonesia’s imports demand equations are falling into the inconclusion zone. 
The Lagrange Multiplier test, which is known as the Breusch-Godfrey test is an alternative to the 
t-test and DW test. This statistic is useful for identifying serial correlation for the first and higher order 
autocorrelation. However, it has two important disadvantages; 1) the LM test is a large sample test, 2) while 
it tests for serial correlation of both AR(p) and MA(q) forms, it is not able to identify which one is the cause 
of autocorrelation if it is detected. 
As indicated, the AR(1) correction for the error covariance matrix is imposed after detrending the 
observations. The autoregressive correlation may have been overestimated8 if the data demonstrates an 
upward or downward trend (Wooldrige, 2008). An upward time trend has been identified in imports 
observations, a common tendency in time series data. Existence of the time trend in some variables may 
lead to the conclusion that these variables are correlated. In fact, the reason is that these variables are 
growing over time for some reasons that are part of the model’s unobserved factors. An exponential trend 
is comprised in the equations of system, because the imports have almost been shown a constant average 
grow rate from period to period.  
To evaluate the performance of the model, after correcting for the first order autocorrelation 
problem and estimation of model parameters a Monte Carlo simulation has been constructed. The 
simulation process was performed from 2000 to 2011 and it is repeated 2000 times. The simulation method 
helps determine whether the structural specification of the model is reasonable and if the estimated 
coefficients make sense. There are also some methods of resampling data such as Bootstrapping and 
Jackknife. In the resampling technique, the simulated samples are drawn from the existing sample of data, 
which are applied for the study, while in a Monte Carlo simulation the data are generating from a 
theoretically defined process. Consequently, in resampling, for example, bootstrapping, there is no control 
                                                            
8 This issue refers to deterministic trends in the data, not stochastic trends. Author investigated whether the variables 
of the model which is studying here have the unit roots or stochastic trends. The unit root test has rejected the 




on the data generating process. The researcher will only assume that the recreated sample data contains all 
information in the distribution of the original sample of the population. In contrast, the Monte Carlo 
simulation applies not only the estimated parameters to forecast but also the model’s covariance matrix. 
The parameter covariance matrix provides perturbations of the parameters for the forecasting process. In a 
system of equations the dynamic structure of the whole model is more important than that of any individual 
equation of the model. Two conditions can be assumed for a model which includes several equations and 
work as a system.  Sometimes all equations may fit the model every well and be statistically significant, 
while the model as a system may not track the series of the data, which are being applied in the study, 
closely. In contrast, there may be some equations (in a system) which do not perform very well individually, 
but keeping them in the system will improve the ability of the model. A Monte Carlo ex post simulation is 
a useful technique that can make clear these kinds of situations. Then, according to the goal of investigation 
and overall statistical fit the researcher will decide whether the constructed specification is appropriate for 
that purpose.  As indicated, there are some situations when researcher has to keep some equations in the 
system even if they are not preforming well, but improve the power of the model as a whole. 
As previously indicated, the period being studied contains data from the first month of 1995 to 
April 2009. While the actual data for the period after April 2009 is also available, an ex post forecast which 
is an unconditional forecast has been generated. Then 95 percent confidence intervals for the model 
dependent variables are created. The confidence interval is a convenient statistical inference to test the 
reliability of the model performance by comparing the actual value of the dependent variable with 
forecasted values. If the actual value lies within the confidence intervals made by Monte Carlo forecasting 
method, one can conclude that the model being study is performed well.  As indicated, Monte Carlo 
simulation is generating data by consideration of the estimated parameters and the perturbations of the 
parameters which are included in the model’s covariance matrix. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation 
process, along with the actual values of the endogenous variables, are presented in the appendix III. 
Generally, the figures indicate that for most endogenous variables such as Chin’s quantity component share 




share in total expenditure, Mexico’s quantity component share in total expenditure, Other Countries 
quantity component share in total expenditure, and Gulf medium size shrimp’s price component share in 
total expenditure, the simulated model fits very well, while in some other cases it does not. Another 
important result obtained from this method is that, for some countries, the actual and predicted values are 
fitting better since 2005 than earlier years before. In addition to the performance of Monte Carlo simulation, 
Theil’s inequality measurements have also been provided. These statistical inferences are shown in next 
three tables. 
  
 Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for the Simultaneous Simulation, 2000 to 2011. 
      Actual Predicted 
Variable9 N Obs N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
WdC_PO 144 2.88E+05 -0.0008 0.024 -0.0012 0.023 
WdE_PO 144 2.88E+05 0.0014 0.016 0.0022 0.023 
WdIi_PO 144 2.88E+05 -0.0002 0.023 0.0004 0.022 
WdIo_PO 144 2.88E+05 0.0015 0.019 0.0016 0.018 
WdM_PO 144 2.88E+05 -0.0045 0.058 -0.0071 0.060 
WdT_PO 144 2.88E+05 -0.0023 0.071 -0.0009 0.075 
WdV_PO 144 2.88E+05 0.0012 0.033 0.0007 0.031 
WdO_PO 144 2.88E+05 0.0022 0.038 0.0022 0.039 
WdL1_PPP 144 2.88E+05 -0.0003 0.002 -0.0002 0.002 
WdL2_PPP 144 2.88E+05 -0.0002 0.002 -0.0002 0.002 
 
 
Table 4.4 illustrates the statistical description of the endogenous variables for actual and predicted 
value. In almost all cases, except for Ecuador’s ordinary demand endogenous variable, the standard 
deviations of forecasts are very close to the actual standard deviations of the dependent variables. 
 
  Table 4.5. Statistics of Fit for the Simultaneous Simulation, 2000-2011. 
                                                            
9 The definition of these variables is provided in appendix I. 
    Mean Mean % RMS RMS % 
Variable N Error Error Error Error 
WdC_PO 2.88E+05 -0.0003 -81.70 0.02 896.70 
WdE_PO 2.88E+05 0.0008 180.80 0.02 6470.70 







In table 4.5 the mean simulation error, the mean percent error, root-mean-square (rms) simulation 
error, and RMS percent error are presented. These simulation statistics are quantitative instruments that 
measure whether historical simulation results match the behavior of the real world (endogenous variables) 
relatively closely. These criterions are defined as follows: 
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       (4.6d) 
where stY is the simulated value of endogenous variable, 
a
tY is the actual value of the endogenous variable, 
and T  is the number of periods in the simulation. Mean simulation error calculates the mean of the 
difference between the predicted endogenous variable value and its true value. It is obvious that the smaller 
the MSE, the more perfect the prediction value, though this is not always the case. The mean square error 
may be equal or close to zero if the large positive errors cancel out the large negative errors. In statistical 
outcomes, along with the MSE measurement, the root mean square error is also reported. The RMS 
WdIo_PO 2.88E+05 0.0001 -42.32 0.02 781.60 
WdM_PO 2.88E+05 -0.0026 -77.72 0.04 5221.80 
WdT_PO 2.88E+05 0.0015 -27.32 0.05 2601.90 
WdV_PO 2.88E+05 -0.0005 -96.98 0.03 2815.00 
WdO_PO 2.88E+05 0.0000 242.20 0.04 4471.70 
WdL1_PPP 2.88E+05 0.0001 -30.34 0.00 1413.10 




eliminates the interaction of the positive and negative errors to each other. The RMS is the root square of 
MSE. Therefore, in some cases a RMS error is a more reliable measure of the simulation performance. 
However, the MSE is also useful, because it captures the systematic bias of the simulation performance, if 
the estimates are biased. As tables 4.5 illustrates both MSE and RMS error are small for all endogenous 
variables of the model. 
The MSE and RMS error criterions are convenient for evaluating a historical simulation 
performance. There are some other criterions which are more beneficial for the ex post forecasts. These 
RMS forecast errors are evaluating the performance of the model by considering all endogenous variables 
forecast errors jointly in its formulation. These simulation statistics are presented in table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6. Theil Forecast Error Statistics for the Dynamic Simultaneous Simulation,  
2000 to 2011. 
MSE Decomposition Proportions 
      Corr Bias Var Covar Inequality Coef 
Variable N MSE (R) (UM) (US) (UC) U1 U 
WdC_PO 2.88E+05 0.0006 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.02 0.53 
WdE_PO 2.88E+05 0.0006 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.93 1.51 0.62 
WdIi_PO 2.88E+05 0.0005 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.51 
WdIo_PO 2.88E+05 0.0005 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.15 0.60 
WdM_PO 2.88E+05 0.0020 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.77 0.38 
WdT_PO 2.88E+05 0.0025 0.77 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.71 0.34 
WdV_PO 2.88E+05 0.0010 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.94 0.49 
WdO_PO 2.88E+05 0.0018 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.13 0.55 
WdL1_PPP 2.88E+05 0.0000 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.12 0.57 
WdL2_PPP 2.88E+05 0.0000 0.33 0.00 0.02 0.98 1.24 0.58 
 









where s and a refers to the standard deviations of the actual and forecast series of the data. Clearly, its 
value falls between zero and one. A value of zero or close to zero implies that the simulated series for the 
endogenous variables are imperfect representatives for the actual series. However, the value of 1 indicates 
a perfect match. Theil’s inequality coefficient and its decomposed coefficients are defined as follows: 































     (4.8a) 
















     (4.8b) 

















     (4.8c) 
















.     (4.8d) 
Theil’s inequality coefficient is bounded between zero and 1. The value of zero corresponds to the 
perfect performance of the model and the value of 1 indicates to perfect inequality or negative 
proportionality between actual and forecast value. The Theil decomposed proportions are allowing 
researchers for possible evaluation of the simulation error regarding its specific source. The sum of these 
three components equals 1. The bias proportion, MU , represents the systematic error of the model. A value 
of zero or close to zero is implying to no or the least systematic bias, which is obviously preferred, 
regardless of the value of Theil’s inequality coefficient (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). The variance 
proportion, SU , implies how powerful the model is to repeat the degree of variability in the variable being 
studied. If the actual series of data contains considerable fluctuations while the forecasts series are not 
demonstrating these variations, the value of SU  will be large. In contrast, a small value of SU indicates 




series. The covariance component of the Theil’s inequality refers to the unsystematic error. As indicated 
the sum of MU , SU , and CU  is 1. Consequently, the CU is, in fact, the remaining error after the deviations 
from average values are taken into account.  
As table 4.6 illustrates, the MU  and SU  values of all endogenous variables are representing a 
perfect performance of the Monte Carlo simulation (ex post forecast), although the correlation coefficients, 
Corr(R), indicate that the simulated values for some dependent variables are not fitting the actual value very 
well. The following simulation statistic is Theil’s modified inequality coefficient which he introduced in 
1966. The difference between the first one (U ) and this criterion ( 1U ) is in their denominators. While the 
first simulation statistic, U , is bounded between zero and 1, the second one has only the lower bound, that 
is, the least value for 1U  is zero, but it has no upper bound value. Therefore, it is hard to decide which 










































 .      (4.9) 
 
4.3. Results and Interpretations 
Prior to the interpretation of the results it is necessary to explain that a test for the homogeneity 
constrain, for each equation, has been conducted. The adding up and symmetry restrictions are not testable, 
while they are directly imposed in the model. The results of tests imply that the null hypotheses which are 
the homogeneity of degree zero respect to prices and income are statistically rejected in 97% level in favor 
of the alternative hypotheses, not being homogenous. These results are so common in deferential demand 
analysis. Ng in 1995, discuss that the reason that the homogeneity tests are rejected in most deferential 
demand system of equations studies, is incorporating of the non-stationary regressors. At this point, the 




problem. As explained before, unit roots tests are demonstrated that this study’s data have not unit roots. 
So, the cause of rejection of homogeneity tests might be some other unknown issues. It can be a subject of 
future studies. 
In addition, a bootstrap resampling (with 1000 times repetitions) is also applied to confirm the 
validation of statistical inferences (t statistics). The residual bootstrap resampling demonstrates that all 
parameter estimates’ “t statistics” are valid, and so all estimates are statistically significant. The significance 
of parameter estimates are shown in each section. 
4.3.1. Model Parameter Estimates 
The mixed Rotterdam demand system includes ten equations, after dropping one equation 
arbitrarily, due to preventing singularity condition for the contemporaneous error covariance matrix. U.S. 
shrimp imports are treated as a price-predetermined, or in other words, quantity dependent framework, and 
demand for Gulf shrimp is specified as a quantity-predetermined/price dependent framework. As mentioned 
earlier in chapter three, in the mixed demand approach, all equations of the system include both exogenous 
quantities and prices of the two groups of demand equations. In addition to these eleven explanatory 
variables, eleven dummy variables, a trend variable, and one more dummy variable for the year of 2005 to 
capture the effect of U.S. anti-dumping duties are added to the equations of the model. Consequently, every 
equation is composed of twenty four explanatory variables. The estimations of the basic parameters of the 
model and their approximate statistical summary are presented in table 4.7.  
This table includes the model’s marginal budget share parameter estimates, i  and r , and the 
reciprocal of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of income parameter estimate,  . The marginal 
budget share (or marginal share) coefficients refer to the amount of money that an individual will spend on 
good i, if his/her income rises by one dollar (Theil, 1987). 
As table 4.7 shows, all marginal shares estimated coefficients’ signs are consistent with consumer 
demand theory, as explained in the previous chapter. The inverse of the income elasticity of the marginal 




estimates are also statistically significant at a 1% level, approximately, except for the small size Gulf shrimp 
product which is statistically significant at a 5% level. The imports demand equations’ dependent variables 
demonstrate the quantity components of the change in the budget share, while the Gulf landings dependent 
variables comprise the price components of the change in the budget share. 
 
          Table 4.7. Parameter Estimates, Their Approximate  
          Standard Deviation, and t-Statistic, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
  Approx  Approx 
Parameter Estimate Std Err t Value Pr > |t| 
cc ( ) -0.2916 0.0477 -6.12 <.0001 
c1 ( C ) 0.0683 0.0112 6.09 <.0001 
c2 ( E ) 0.0356 0.0131 2.71 0.0075 
c3 ( Ii ) 0.0933 0.0109 8.53 <.0001 
c4 ( Io ) 0.0327 0.0103 3.18 0.0018 
c5 ( M ) 0.1277 0.0210 6.07 <.0001 
c6 ( T ) 0.4025 0.0249 16.19 <.0001 
c7 ( V ) 0.1198 0.0138 8.70 <.0001 
c8 ( V ) 0.1047 0.0200 5.24 <.0001 
s1 ( 1L ) -0.0044 0.0009 -4.68 <.0001 
s2 ( 2L ) -0.0044 0.0011 -4.01 <.0001 
s3 ( 3L ) -0.0063 0.0032 -1.96 0.0511 
 
 
The interpretation of the coefficient estimates are presented as Theil’s study (1987). The China’s 
demand equation coefficient estimates, for the marginal share, indicates that if U.S. expenditures on shrimp 
products increases by $100 this country will spend $7 more to import shrimp products from China, 
considering all other variables are fixed. 
The same interpretation is applicable for the marginal budget share coefficients of all other 
countries. For example, the U.S. will spend $40 on shrimp imports from Thailand, with all other variables 
constant, if its total expenditure on shrimp products increases by100$, which is the highest marginal share 




after Thailand. If the U.S. expenditure on shrimp products increases by 100 dollars with all other variables 
constant, this country will spend $12 of it on importing shrimps from Mexico (figure 4.1).  
 
 
        Figure 4.1. Marginal Budget Share Estimates by Each Country and Gulf  
       Landings, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
 
It is important to explain that, as it is shown in table 4.7, the Gulf landings marginal share 
coefficients are negative. These negative signs are representing the negative of minus marginal budget 
shares, which are, in turn, expressing positive signs of the marginal budget shares for the Gulf landings. 
Accordingly, the Gulf shrimp landings marginal share coefficients can be interpreted similar to these 
coefficients for the U.S. shrimp imports. For example, the U.S. is willing to spend 44 cent on Gulf large are 
summarized in table 4.8. As the table demonstrates, the anti-dumping dummy parameter estimates are only 
significant for Ecuador, India, size shrimp products if its total expenditure on the shrimp products increases 
by 100 dollars, considering all other variables are fixed. 
4.3.2. Anti-dumping Parameter Estimates 
Anti-dumping duties imposed on six countries including China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and Brazil in 2005. All these countries except Brazil are included in this study. Therefore, an anti-dumping 




















Mexico, and all Other Countries export (to the U.S.) variables. Ecuador’s and Mexico’s coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at 1% level, while the coefficients for India and Other Countries’ 
exports to the U.S. are statistically significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The antidumping 
estimates are negative for Ecuador, India, and Other countries, though it is positive for Mexico. That is, 
antidumping duties have had a negative effect on Ecuador and India exports to the United States. As 
expected, these duties have had positive effects on Mexico, which is not subject to anti-dumping 
resolutions. In other words, the antidumping duties caused Ecuador and India’s exports to decrease, but 
Mexico’s exports to rise. Ecuador and India quantity shares of U.S. expenditures on shrimp have been 
declined by 0.01 and 0.01 for every level of price, since the last quarter of 2004 (months October, 
November, and December), respectively. Note that in this study, the anti-dumping effect captures indirectly 
through market price adjustment, as anti-dumping duties only affect the supply of shrimp imports.  
 
     Table 4.8. Antidumping Parameter Estimates, Their Approximate 









Pr > |t| 
d_China -0.0019 0.0038 -0.51 0.6109 
d_Ecuador -0.0095 0.0040 -2.40 0.0175 
d_India -0.0058 0.0034 -1.70 0.0914 
d_Indonesia -0.0036 0.0033 -1.09 0.2765 
d_Mexico 0.0231 0.0069 3.34 0.0010 
d_Thailand 0.0119 0.0078 1.54 0.1256 
d_Vietnam -0.0016 0.0047 -0.33 0.7404 
d_Other Countries -0.0121 0.0062 -1.94 0.0546 
d_Large Shrimps -0.0005 0.0005 -1.16 0.2459 
d_Med Shrimps -0.0005 0.0004 -1.11 0.2699 
d_Small Shrimps 0.0006 0.0014 0.43 0.6695 
In general, as theoretically expected, the anti-dumping duties (on those six named countries in the 
law) should reduce their exports to the Unites States. Therefore, the supply of shrimp imports from these 
countries will shift to the left. Consequently, the market equilibrium will change, as the demand function is 
stable. That is, at a new equilibrium point, the quantity of demand will decrease. Therefore, the indicated 




In contrast, antidumping duties motivate Mexico’s quantity share of U.S. total expenditures on 
shrimp to increase by 0.02 in every level of price after October 2004. 
4.3.3. Monthly Dummy Parameter Estimates 
As indicated, the data for Gulf shrimp landings and shrimp imports display considerable seasonal 
variability.  Given the assumption that the seasonal variations may not be captured with the price changes,   
the monthly dummy variables are added to the equations of the model. In fact, monthly dummy variables 
are included to grab the effect of a number of unmeasured time related elements. Like the antidumping 
dummy variable, these dummy variables are also regarded as shift variables for the supply of Gulf shrimp. 
There are eleven monthly dummy variables in every equation. The last month’s dummy variable has been 
dropped in each equation to avoid the full collinearity problem. 
Accordingly, any dummy variable that appears in the system is being compared with the last month, 
December. The estimated results and their asymptotic standard errors are given in table 4.9. For the China’s 
regular demand equation; only March, April, and November dummy variables are significant. The monthly 
dummy coefficient of March is negative which means that China’s share in U.S. total expenditure on shrimp 
productions in the month of March is %2.1 less than December. Both monthly dummy coefficient estimates 
of April and November are positive which mean that China’s share in U.S. total expenditure on shrimps in 
months April and November are %1.0 and %1.1 less than December, respectively. Ecuador’ monthly 




Table 4.9. Parameter Estimates for Monthly Dummy Variables, 1995(1)-2010(4). 























  Estimate 0.004 -0.005 -0.021* 0.010*** 0.004 -0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.011** 
China Std Err 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  t Value 0.75 -0.99 -3.81 1.81 0.75 -1.39 1.13 0.73 0.66 -0.92 1.96 
  Estimate -0.012** -0.004 0.012** -0.009 -0.017* -0.019* -0.028* -0.029* -0.028* -0.019* -0.020* 
Ecuador Std Err 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 
  t Value -1.83 -0.65 1.93 -1.48 -2.69 -2.73 -4.20 -4.32 -4.27 -2.77 -3.17 
  Estimate 0.011** -0.006 -0.008 -0.021* -0.016* -0.019* -0.001 -0.003 -0.024* -0.031* -0.011** 
India Std Err 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
  t Value 2.10 -1.24 -1.56 -4.05 -3.14 -3.30 -0.25 -0.51 -4.24 -5.28 -2.11 
  Estimate 0.005 0.002 0.016* -0.014* 0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013* -0.008 0.009*** 
Indonesia Std Err 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
  t Value 1.01 0.37 3.29 -2.83 0.65 -1.64 -0.88 -0.41 -2.50 -1.34 -1.84 
  Estimate 0.004 0.018*** 0.026* 0.023** 0.009 0.002 0.021*** 0.038* 0.108* 0.128* -0.001 
Mexico Std Err 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
  t Value 0.37 1.78 2.49 2.21 0.83 0.16 1.79 3.35 10.06 11.16 -0.11 
  Estimate -0.007 0.012 -0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.021 -0.008 0.004 -0.003 -0.011 0.044* 
Thailand Std Err 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 
  t Value -0.54 1.09 -0.37 0.26 -0.60 1.64 -0.65 0.31 -0.28 -0.82 3.67 
  Estimate 0.017* -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.014*** 0.002 
Vietnam Std Err 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
  t Value 2.38 -0.43 -0.68 0.45 1.18 1.48 -0.35 0.66 -0.38 -1.86 0.31 
  Estimate -0.023** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.005 0.033* 0.004 0.012 -0.012 -0.033* -0.037* -0.015 
Other Count. Std Err 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  t Value -2.320 -1.740 -1.660 0.500 3.540 0.390 1.210 -1.200 -3.360 -3.610 -1.600 
Large Estimate -0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.004* -0.004* -0.001** 0.000 
Size Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Landings t Value -1.20 2.38 -0.83 -0.09 -1.07 -2.49 -1.02 -6.94 -6.14 -2.35 0.53 
Medium Estimate 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Size Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Landings t Value 0.18 0.34 -0.92 -0.13 -0.86 -2.03 -6.42 -1.45 -0.68 -1.18 -0.65 
Small Estimate 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.017* 0.020* 0.010* 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 
Size Std Err 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Landings t Value 0.40 0.58 0.85 0.17 -5.63 9.98 4.62 0.12 -1.80 0.15 0.21 
*significant at 1% level  
**significant at 5% level  
***significant at 10% level  




In all other months the monthly dummy parameter estimates make a shift in the demand equation 
of Ecuador’s imports to the U.S. with respect to month December. In months January, April, May, 
September, October, and November, monthly dummy parameter estimates are making a shift in the demand 
equation in regard to December. While in January, India’s share in imports to the U.S. is %1.1 more than 
December. In months April, May, June, September, October, and November with respect to the month of 
December India’s share in U.S. total expenditure on shrimp products declines. In contrast, Mexico’s shares 
in the U.S. total expenditure on shrimps are higher than December in most months. 
As demonstrated in table 4.9, most of the monthly dummy coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant. The main reason for including monthly dummy variables in the system is to avoid specification 
error. The primary interest of this study is to estimate the determinants of the U.S demand for the shrimp 
products. Eliminating the seasonal variations from the model could result in a misspecified model, which 
in turn may cause the coefficient estimates to be biased.  In this regard, either the significance of coefficient 
estimates or testing hypothesis about these estimates are not of particular interest. 
4.3.4. Trend Parameter Estimates 
  As indicated, some upward time trends have been identified in the imports data, as is common in 
time series observations. Ignoring this data tendency may lead to misconclusion of variable responsiveness, 
especially when serial correlation is an issue10.  
As table 4.10 illustrates, the trend parameter estimates for Ecuador, India, Mexico, Other Countries, 
and Large size Gulf shrimp productions are significant, although their estimates are negligible. The 
important issue is that detrending the data has been assisted to a major reduction of autocorrelation problem 




                                                            
10 As explained, observations which are incorporated in this study have no unit roots problem. So, only deterministic 




Table 4.10. Trend Parameter Estimates, Their Approximate  
Standard Deviation, and t-Statistic, 1995(1)-2010(4). 







Pr > |t| 
t_China 0.00000 0.00003 -0.05 0.9595 
t_Ecuador 0.00011 0.00003 3.69 0.0003 
t_India 0.00007 0.00003 2.87 0.0046 
t_Indonesia 0.00003 0.00002 1.36 0.1765 
t_Mexico -0.00025 0.00005 -4.99 <.0001 
t_Thailand -0.00005 0.00006 -0.94 0.3509 
t_Vietnam 0.00000 0.00003 0.01 0.9948 
t_Other Countries 0.00009 0.00005 1.92 0.0566 
t_Large Size Shrimp 0.00001 0.00000 1.79 0.0750 
t_Medium Size Shrimp 0.00000 0.00000 1.35 0.1777 
t_Small Size Shrimp -0.00001 0.00001 -0.51 0.6096 
 
4.3.5. Elasticity Estimates 
Estimated elasticities will provide a better understanding of a mixed Rotterdam demand equations. 
As indicated, the Rotterdam specification has been defined under double-log functions, this property makes 
the estimation of the demand elasticity terms straightforward. These elasticities are uncompensated 
elasticities (Brown and Lee, 2006). While the dependent variables are the budget shares times log 
differences, these elasticities are calculated at mean point of budget shares.  
In this study the mixed Rotterdam demand system includes eleven equations. Every equation 
comprises eleven price and quantity explanatory variables that associate with elasticity measurements. 
Therefore, this demand model contains 143 elasticity estimates.  This mixed Rotterdam demand system is 
accomplished with eight regular demand equations and three inverse demand equations. Accordingly, some 
of these elasticity estimates are reflecting the flexibility estimates, but in a mixed demand specification all 
of them are considered as elasticity to be convenient to interpret. As indicated in the previous chapter, all 
these elasticity estimates are uncompensated demand elasticities due to consideration of Marshaillan 





4.3.5.1. Uncompensated Price Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
Table 4.11 illustrates the uncompensated price elasticity estimates which are obtained from 
ordinary demand functions (imports demand equations). In this table, along with the price elasticity 
estimates their standard deviation and t-value statistics are presented. As it is shown in table 4.11, all own 
price elasticities (diagonal elements) are negative and cross-price elasticities are positive. The cross-price 
elasticity of demand measures the interdependence of the different products or different types of one 
product. The positive cross-price elasticities mean the imported shrimps from all countries are a substitute 
for one another. For example, if the ratio of India’s monthly shrimp export price increases by 1%, the ratio 
of consumption for China’s shrimp will increase by 0.04% (row 1, column 3), holding all other variables 
constant. 
The magnitudes of all elasticities are less than 1%, because they are the ratio lagged monthly 
price11. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that whether the demand functions are elastic or inelastic. 
The element of row 8, column 1 indicates that if the ratio of China’s price of shrimp exports increases by 
1%, the ratio of consumption for U.S. shrimp imports from all Other Countries, which are not included to 
the model directly, will only increase by 0.01%, while all other factors are fixed. As indicated, the own-
price elasticities of demand for all countries which are included into the model are negative. It shows the 
percentage of decreases in the ratio of consumption if the ratio of prices from one month to a month before 
increases by one percent. The negative signs imply that a one percent increase in ratio of price for example 
for India (column 3, row 3) will cause the ratio of quantity of demand for India to decrease by 0.43%, 
holding all other variables constant. Own-price elasticity of Thailand imports demand to the U.S. is (-0.25) 
indicating that an increase in the ratio of shrimp imports price of Thailand by 1% will cause the ratio of 
quantity of demand for this country to fall by 0.25%, holding all other factors constant. The largest ratio of 
effect belongs to India and Vietnam, which is about (-0.43%) for both countries.   
                                                            
11 Uncompensated elasticities are elasticity estimates of the Marshallian/ordinary demand curve in which the 
consumer’s income is holding constant. An alternative demand curve is the Hicksian/compensated demand function, 
in which the consumer’s utility will hold constant. Compensated elasticities are the elasticity estimates of these types 




This means if the India and Vietnam price of imports go up by 1%, the quantity of demand for each 
of these countries will decline by 0.43%, with all other factors being fixed. The second largest own-price 
elasticity of demand goes to China and Mexico which is about (-0.40%). As table 4.11 demonstrates, the 
own-price elasticity of demand for Thailand (-0.25%) is less than China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam. 
A glance at the table 4.11 indicates that Thailand has the largest cross-price elasticity of demand 
(column 6) among all exporting countries. For example, the effect of a 1% increase in Thailand shrimp 
export prices on China’s shrimp export quantities to the U.S. is an increase of 0.17%. This estimate for 
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Vietnam, and Other Countries is an increase of 0.04%, 0.19%, 0.05%, 
0.19%, 0.19%, and 0.7%, respectively. 
Several factors can influence the price elasticity of demand. The number of substitutes and the 
extent to which the substitute goods are available are important factors. Other factors include the amount 
of income one allocates to the good, the type of good, and time to adjust. For instance, if the price of a good 
goes up while the consumer’s income stays the same, he or she will buy less of that good. Therefore, a 
good’s demand is more sensitive to change in price if there is no change in the consumer’s income. The 
type of commodity is also important. For example, even a large increase in price does not drastically 
decrease consumption of a necessary good. A consumer can find a better substitute for a good if he or she 
has enough time to search for an acceptable substitution. The only factor among all these factors that makes 
a difference between Thailand and named countries above is the number of substitutions for the Thailand’s 
shrimp. It seems Thailand’s shrimp is strong substitutes for China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam’s shrimp 
products. However, the reverse relationship is not true. Other factors such as time and income have the 
same effect on these countries, while in this study, the demand market and duration of research are the same 





Table 4.11. Uncompensated Price Elasticity Estimates for Ordinary Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
    
China Ecuador India Indonesia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Other 
Countries 
  Estimate -0.399* 0.015** 0.040* 0.014* 0.055* 0.172* 0.051* 0.045* 
China Std Err 0.083 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.038 0.013 0.012 
  t Value -4.82 2.35 4.08 2.83 3.97 4.50 3.95 3.73 
  Estimate 0.007** -0.103* 0.010** 0.003** 0.014** 0.043* 0.013* 0.011** 
Ecuador Std Err 0.003 0.040 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.005 0.005 
  t Value 2.35 -2.55 2.43 2.20 2.38 2.49 2.51 2.25 
  Estimate 0.032* 0.017** -0.429* 0.016* 0.060* 0.191* 0.057* 0.050* 
India Std Err 0.008 0.007 0.082 0.006 0.015 0.040 0.013 0.013 
  t Value 4.08 2.43 -5.22 2.69 4.05 4.77 4.51 3.78 
  Estimate 0.009* 0.005** 0.012* -0.128* 0.017* 0.053* 0.016* 0.014** 
Indonesia Std Err 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.045 0.007 0.019 0.006 0.006 
  t Value 2.83 2.20 2.69 -2.87 2.56 2.77 2.82 2.41 
  Estimate 0.031* 0.016** 0.043* 0.015* -0.401* 0.185* 0.055* 0.048* 
Mexico Std Err 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.089 0.044 0.013 0.014 
  t Value 3.97 2.38 4.05 2.56 -4.51 4.19 4.10 3.44 
  Estimate 0.028* 0.015* 0.038* 0.013* 0.052* -0.246* 0.049* 0.043* 
Thailand Std Err 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.041 0.010 0.011 
  t Value 4.50 2.49 4.77 2.77 4.19 -5.99 5.11 4.08 
  Estimate 0.033* 0.017* 0.045* 0.016* 0.062* 0.194* -0.425* 0.051* 
Vietnam Std Err 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.015 0.038 0.077 0.013 
  t Value 3.95 2.51 4.51 2.82 4.10 5.11 -5.52 3.92 
  Estimate 0.011* 0.006* 0.015* 0.005* 0.021* 0.066* 0.020* -0.146* 
Other Countires Std Err 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.035 
  t Value 3.73 2.25 3.78 2.41 3.44 4.08 3.92 -4.23 
*significant at 1% level         
**significant at 5% level         
***significant at 10% level         




The Lerner index demonstrates the relationship between a firm’s price elasticity of demand and its 
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This index along with Thailand’s largest share in U.S. total expenditures on shrimp reveals that 
Thailand has some degree of market power relative to China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam in the U.S. shrimp 
industry. 
4.3.5.2. Uncompensated Price Elasticity of Inverse Demand 
In this section the estimation of uncompensated price elasticities for the Gulf shrimp landings are 
presented. Figure 4.2 and table 4.12 demonstrates these estimations. The price elasticity of these inverse 
demand equations are determined by the ratio of Gulf dockside price change from one month to a month 
before, resulting from a one percent change in the ratio of price, from one month to a month before, for a 





      Table 4.12. Uncompensated Price Flexibility/Elasticity Estimates for the Inverse Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
 
   
China Ecuador India Indonesia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Other 
Countries 
Large Estimate 0.002* 0.001** 0.003* 0.001* 0.005* 0.014* 0.004* 0.004* 
 Size Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 Landings t Value 3.73 2.26 4.03 2.49 3.72 4.24 4.15 3.34 
Medium Estimate 0.003* 0.002** 0.004* 0.001* 0.006* 0.018* 0.005* 0.005* 
 Size Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 
 Landings t Value 3.41 2.15 3.72 2.58 3.27 3.84 3.84 3.09 
Small Estimate 0.004** 0.002*** 0.005** 0.002*** 0.007** 0.022** 0.006** 0.006** 
 Size Std Err 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.003 
 Landings t Value 1.95 1.65 2.08 1.72 1.98 2.06 2.05 1.93 
*significant at 1% level        
**significant at 5% level        
***significant at 10% level        










As table 4.12 demonstrates, all elasticity estimates are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
and 5% levels, which implies that if a county’s ratio of price changes by 1%, the ratio of Gulf shrimp 
landings for any selected size will also increase. This relation seems rational. That is, an increase in the 
ratio of export price of a country will cause the consumption for this country’s shrimp productions to 
decrease. At a fixed supply, the demand for the Gulf shrimps will shift to the right, indicating that in every 
level of quantity demanded, the price of Gulf shrimp also increases. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Price Flexibility of Inverse Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4).   
 
The most effective price changes on Gulf landings associated with Thailand’s shrimp export prices. 
A one percent increase in the ratio of Thailand shrimp prices will increase the price of large, medium, and 
small sizes of Gulf shrimp products by 0.01%, 0.02%, and 0.02%, respectively.  
4.3.5.3. Uncompensated Quantity Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
These elasticity estimates are demonstrated in table 4.13; they are estimated from the imports 
demand equations, as they are regular (or ordinary) demand equations in the system. They show the 
quantity-quantity responsiveness between the Gulf shrimp quantity of landings and the quantity of shrimp 























As table 4.13 illustrates, all the elasticity estimates are positive, as is theoretically expected and all 
of them are statistically significant. It is important to say that, in this process, a change in the Gulf shrimp 
products has an indirect effect on the quantity of shrimp imports. For example,  the quantity elasticity 
estimated for the Gulf large size shrimps equals 0.002, implying a 1% increase in the ratio of quantity of 
demand for the Gulf large shrimp (from one month to a month before) increases the ratio of consumption 
for the shrimp imports from China by 0.002%, all other factors are held constant. 
        
 
       Table 4.13. Uncompensated Quantity Elasticity Estimates for the Ordinary 
       Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 








  Estimate 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
China Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  t Value 3.73 3.41 1.95 
  Estimate 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
Ecuador Std Err 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 
  t Value 2.26 2.15 1.65 
  Estimate 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
India Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  t Value 4.03 3.72 2.08 
  Estimate 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*** 
Indonesia Std Err 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  t Value 2.49 2.58 1.72 
  Estimate 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
Mexico Std Err 0.0005 0.0006 0.0016 
  t Value 3.72 3.27 1.98 
  Estimate 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
Thailand Std Err 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  t Value 4.24 3.84 2.06 
  Estimate 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
Vietnam Std Err 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  t Value 4.15 3.84 2.05 
  Estimate 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 
Other Countries Std Err 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  t Value 3.34 3.09 1.93 
*significant at 1% level    
**significant at 5% level    
***significant at 10% level    





All other elasticity estimates which are shown in this table can be interpreted in the same way. As 
table 4.13 illustrates, all the effects are very small. 
4.3.5.4. Uncompensated Quantity Elasticity of Inverse Demand 
The quantity elasticities/flexibility estimations express the percentage changes in value of the ratio 
of Gulf dockside prices regarding the 1% change in the ratio of Gulf shrimp landings’ quantities. In fact, 
these elasticities indicate the interrelations between the Gulf large, medium, and small size shrimps prices 
and quantities (table 4.14).  
     
 
    Table 4.14. Uncompensated Quantity Flexibility/Elasticity Estimates for the  
     Inverse Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 







  Estimate -0.0352 0.0002 0.0002 
Large Size Landings Std Err 0.008 0.000 0.000 
  t Value -4.47 2.68 1.91 
  Estimate 0.0002 -0.0441 0.0003 
Medium Size Landings Std Err 0.000 0.011 0.000 
  t Value 2.68 -3.98 1.81 
  Estimate 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0538 
Small Size Landings Std Err 0.000 0.000 0.026 
  t Value 1.91 1.81 -2.09 
*significant at 1% level    
**significant at 5% level    
***significant at 10% level    
Without * means is not significant   
 
As theoretically expected, the own-quantity elasticities of inverse demand are negative and cross-
quantity elasticities of inverse demand are positive. If the ratio of Gulf large shrimp landings, from one 
month to a month before, goes up by 1% the ratio of Gulf large size shrimp dockside price decreases by 
0.035%, with all other variables are constant. If the ratio of Gulf medium size shrimp landings from one 
month to a month before increases by 1%, the ratio of Gulf medium size shrimp dockside price decreases 




month to a month before goes up by 1%, the ratio of Gulf small size shrimp dockside price will decrease 
by 0.054%, holding all other factors constant. A one percent increase in the ratio of large size shrimp 
landings will cause the ratio of medium and small size Gulf shrimp dockside price to go up by 0.0002% 
and 0.0002%, respectively, holding all other variables constant. If the ratio of consumption for the medium 
size of Gulf shrimp goes up by 1%, the ratio of Gulf shrimp dockside prices for the large and small sizes 
will increase by 0.0002% and 0.0002%, respectively, while all other variables are fixed. 
4.3.5.5. Income/Expenditure Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
The calculation of income elasticities for the regular demand equations of the system are presented 





  .          (4.11)  
These elasticities are estimated at the mean value of budget share. As indicated, these elasticities attributed 
to the relations between the U.S. income/ expenditure on shrimp products and the quantity of imports for 
every country, as they are the endogenous variables for the regular demand equations. Table 4.15 presents 
these estimations. As shown in table 4.15, all income elasticity estimates for ordinary demand are positive. 
That is, if the American expenditure on shrimp products increases by 1%, they will spend some of this 
increase on shrimp imports. For example, the income elasticity of demand coefficient for China is 1.46, 
implying that if the American expenditure on shrimp products increases by 1%, their consumption of 
China’s shrimp will increase by 1.46%. Since this coefficient estimate is more than one, it means that if the 
American expenditure on shrimp products increases, the share of China’s shrimp quantity (consumed by 
American) will also increase. Americans will not only buy more China’s shrimp but they will also substitute 
other countries shrimp products for China’s shrimp product. This means that China’s share in total 
expenditure will also increase. These coefficient estimates for India, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam are 
more than one and equal 1.62, 1.58, 1.41, and 1.66, respectively.  These coefficient estimates for Ecuador, 
Indonesia, and Other Countries are less than one, and equal 0.36, 0.46, and 0.56, respectively. This means 




of these countries shrimp products by 0.37%, 0.46%, and 0.56%, respectively. Because these estimates are 
less than one, it means these countries’ shares will decrease. As indicated, the income elasticity contains 
not only the proportionate change resulting from a scale expansion in the consumption bundle, but also the 
elasticity of substitution effects (Park and Thurman, 1999). So, if it equals one, it means the consumer will 
not change the proportion of consuming that good. The share of the good is held the same as before, which 
shows that preferences are homothetic. When it is less than one for some goods, it means when 
income/expenditure increases, the consumer will increase his/her consumption of those commodities but 
the goods’ proportions, related to other goods, will decrease. In our case, Americans substitute some of 
their consumption of Ecuador, Indonesia, and Other Countries shrimp products for other countries shrimps, 
such as Mexico or China. Some other justifications about the income elasticities of demand related to the 
type of commodity.  
 
 
  Figure 4.3. Income Elasticity of Ordinary Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
 
If the income elasticity of demand is negative, it is interpreted as inferior goods. As income elasticity is 
positive, but less than one, the commodity will fall into the normal goods category. Finally, income 
elasticity greater than one refers to luxuries. In this regard, all countries shrimp products except Ecuador, 
Indonesia, and Other Countries may be considered luxuries. For Ecuador, Indonesia, and all Other 
Countries’ not named in this study directly, imported shrimp products are taken as normal goods. 
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Table 4.15. Income Elasticity Estimates for Ordinary Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
  
China Ecuador India Indonesia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Other 
Countries 
Estimate 1.468* 0.365* 1.624* 0.455* 1.576* 1.409* 1.657* 0.561* 
Std Err 0.241 0.135 0.190 0.143 0.260 0.087 0.190 0.107 
t Value 6.09 2.71 8.53 3.18 6.07 16.19 8.7 5.24 
*significant at 1% level       
**significant at 5% level       
***significant at 10% level       
Without * means is not significant      
 
4.3.5.6. Income/Expenditure Elasticity of Inverse Demand 
The income elasticities of inverse demand equations of the system are the ratio of marginal budget 







 .           (4.12) 
Like income elasticity of regular demand, the income elasticities for inverse demand equations are 
also estimated at mean value of budget shares. The income/expenditure elasticity of inverse demand is 
associated with the responsiveness between the American income/expenditure and the Gulf dockside prices.  
As indicated, the income elasticity illustrates the effect of income on endogenous variables. For the 
inverse demand equations in mixed model the Gulf shrimp prices are endogenous variables.  That is, for 
example, if the American expenditure on shrimp products increases by 1%, they will spend 0.12%, 0.12%, 






Figure 4.4. Income Elasticity of Inverse Demand during 1995(1)-2010(4). 
 
 
      Table 4.16. Income Elasticity Estimates for  







0.121* 0.152* 0.186** 
0.026 0.038 0.089 
4.68 4.01 2.08 
*significant at 1% level  
**significant at 5% level  
***significant at 10% level  
Without * means is not significant 
 
As indicated in chapter 3, in order to satisfying the adding up constraint, the budget share weighted average 



































To test that whether this restriction is imposed correctly, the sum of income elasticities for both 
ordinary and inverse demands are shown in table 4.17.  
            
      Table 4.17. Sum of Income Elasticities across Different Types 








China 1.47 0.0465 0.0683 
Ecuador 0.36 0.0976 0.0356 
India 1.62 0.0574 0.0933 
Indonesia 0.46 0.0719 0.0327 
Mexico 1.58 0.0811 0.1277 
Thailand 1.41 0.2856 0.4025 
Vietnam 1.66 0.0723 0.1198 
Other Countries 0.56 0.1866 0.1047 
Large size landings 0.12 0.0362 0.0044 
Medium size landings 0.15 0.0286 0.0044 
small size landings 0.19 0.0361 0.0067 
sum(mw*IncElas)=1 1.0000 1.0000 
 
This restriction is imposed at mean values of corresponding budget shares. As table 4.17 presents 
the budget share weighted average of all income elasticities equal one, which indicates the adding up 
condition has been imposed, properly. Comparing column 3 and 4, each country and landings share in total 
expenditure is also changed after a 1% increase in U.S. expenditure on shrimp products. 
4.3.5.7. Scale Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
The scale elasticity of regular demand measures the relations between the consumption of Gulf 
shrimp products (the ratio of quantity from one month to a month before), considered a bundle (including 
large, medium, and small sizes) and the ratio of the consumption for a selected country. In other words, 




due to a scale expansion in the consumption of Gulf shrimps’ bundle.  As presented in table 4.18, all these 
estimates are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level. The estimated scale elasticity for China, 
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, Other Countries equals 0.007, 0.002, 0.007, 0.002, 
0.007, 0.006, 0.007, and 0.003 implying a 1% increase in the ratio of bundle of Gulf shrimp products raises 
the ratio of consumption for China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, Other Countries 
shrimp exports to the U.S. increase by 0.007%, 0.002%, 0.007%, 0.002%, 0.007%, 0.006%, 0.007%, and 
0.003%, respectively, holding all other factors constant.  
 
Table 4.18. Scale Elasticity Estimates for Ordinary Demand, 1995(1)-2010(4). 
  
China Ecuador India Indonesia Mexico Thailand Vietnam 
Other 
Countries 
Estimate 0.007* 0.002** 0.007* 0.002** 0.007* 0.006* 0.007* 0.003* 
Std Err 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
t Value 3.31 2.19 3.77 2.44 3.32 3.79 3.73 3.1 
*significant at 1% level        
**significant at 5% level        
***significant at 10% level        
Without * means is not significant       
 
4.3.5.8. Scale Elasticity of Inverse Demand 
These estimates are implying to the degree of change in Gulf shrimp dockside prices due to a scale 
expansion in the consumption of the Gulf shrimp bundle. These estimates are presented in table 4.19. As it 
is shown, all scale elasticities are negative. The Gulf large and medium size shrimps’ scale elasticity of 
demand is statistically significant at a1% level, while the scale elasticity for small size Gulf shrimp is 
statistically significant at a 5% level. The scale elasticity of large size Gulf shrimp product is -0.03, 
indicating a 1% increase in the Gulf shrimp bundle will decrease the price of large size shrimp by 0.03%. 
The scale elasticity of demand for the medium and small size Gulf shrimps are -0.044 and -0.53, which 




shrimp products will decrease by -0.044% and -0.53%, respectively. As indicated, these elasticities for 
demand are estimated at the ratio of price and quantity of demand rather than their levels. 
            
 
          Table 4.19. Scale Elasticity Estimates for  








-0.023* -0.028* -0.035** 
0.006 0.008 0.017 
-3.65 -3.41 -1.99 
*significant at 1% level  
**significant at 5% level  
***significant at 10% level  



































CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study has attempted to construct a more reliable specification for U.S. shrimp demand system. 
This study is the first case of a mixed Rotterdam demand system to provide theoretical and fundamental 
information about the U.S. shrimp industry. The results obtained from this study provide some fundamental 
information for the U.S. shrimp industry and policy makers, especially for the Gulf of Mexico shrimp 
industry specialists.  
As indicated in previous chapters, since the 1980s U.S. shrimp imports have increased annually 
and represent 90% of total U.S. shrimp supply in recent decades. Specifically, increasing foreign supply 
has been associated with a reduction of the import price. United States shrimp market specialists are 
concerned that there is unfair price competition between domestic producers and shrimp exporting 
countries. The Southern Shrimp Alliance has open concept about unfair pricing several times during the 
last two decades. They filed an antidumping petition to stop unfair pricing by exporting countries in 2003. 
Following investigations by the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC), they passed an antidumping law in six countries in January of 2005. However, 
antidumping duties have not helped domestic shrimp producers, processors, and distributors to obtain a 
larger share of the shrimp market.  
Researchers have searched for reasons why the domestic shrimp market is unable to compete with 
exporting countries; however, this problem has remained unsolved. This study has adopted a new 
methodology to study the shrimp market. One of the advantages of this study is that it provides evidence of 
demand sensitivity with respect to a change in price of imports and U.S. expenditure on shrimp products 
by their source origin.  
This author believes that shrimp imports and the domestic market have two different structures, 
which also means two different price/quantity relations. It has been shown that the annual production of 
shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico has remained relatively stable, during last two decades, while the dockside 




the quantity of import the shrimp import price is decreasing. That means, the shrimp import market does 
not follow the same price/quantity relationship as the domestic shrimp market.  
5.1. Implications for Methodology 
One of the basic objectives of this study is to introduce a different approach that demonstrates a 
more realistic model of the U.S. shrimp market using a mixed demand system. To prove that this new 
method is able to determine U.S. shrimp market factors, a mixed Rotterdam demand specification has been 
adopted, which is associated with both ordinary and inverse demand functions. As the domestic supply has 
been stable over time, a quantity pre-determined framework, inverse demand, is considered for the domestic 
shrimp production, while a price pre-determined framework, regular demand, has been adopted for the 
shrimp import market. The results of this investigation have verified that a simple market structure, regular 
or inverse demand alone, cannot capture the complexity of the U.S. shrimp market. As expected 
theoretically, and shown in Chapter 4, the coefficient estimates of the regular demand, i , are positive and 
the parameter estimates of the inverse demand, r , are negative. This result cannot be obtained if one 
model, a regular or inverse demand function. For the U.S. shrimp market was applied. Price elasticity 
estimates of the ordinary/regular demand function also show that a mixed demand structure is more reliable 
for the U.S. shrimp market relative to a simple ordinary/regular demand or an inverse demand system. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, the own and cross price elasticities of regular demand are theoretically consistent 
and statistically significant. Specifically, the own-price elasticity of demand for each country is associated 
with a significant effect. This result is unattainable from regressing a regular demand, or an inverse demand, 
model alone, because, in such a model, the quantity of demand for imported shrimp will be considered an 
exogenous variable and the import prices do not involve in the model at all. The positive cross-price 
elasticities also imply that imported shrimp products are substitutes for one another. Jones et al.’s study 
reached a different conclusion and shows that shrimp imports are complementary goods. They adopted an 
inverse Netherlands Central Bureau Statistic demand system model (CBS). The author of this dissertation 




market. Therefore, a mixed demand, and, in this study, a mixed Rotterdam demand, is a specification that 
can illustrate the U.S. shrimp market structure better than any parameterization of  regular demand or an 
inverse demand.  
5.2. Implications for Shrimp Demand Market 
In this section, the results are organized into seven categories, which include anti-dumping 
parameter estimates, marginal budget share estimates, the price elasticities of ordinary/regular demands, 
the price elasticities of inverse demands, the quantity flexibilities/elasticities of regular demands, the 
income elasticities of ordinary demands, and the income elasticities of inverse demands.  
5.2.1. Anti-dumping Parameter Estimates 
As expected, the anti-dumping dummy variable parameter estimates revealed that these duties had 
negative effects on Ecuador and India’s shrimp imports, though it had a positive effect on Mexico’s shrimp 
imports. As indicated in previous chapters, the anti-dumping duties are imposed on six countries which 
include both Ecuador and India’s shrimp imports, but not Mexico’s shrimp imports. These results imply 
that anti-dumping duties had significant effect on the U.S. domestic shrimp market for imports from 
Ecuador, India, and Mexico. The anti-dumping coefficient estimates for other named countries in anti-
dumping law, which are also included in this study are not statistically significant.  
5.2.2. Marginal Budget Share Estimates 
In Chapter 4, it is shown that Thailand has the largest share of U.S. expenditures on shrimp during 
1995(1)-2010(4). This means that the United States is spending more of its shrimp income/expenditure on 
Thailand’s exports relative to any other country’s exports. Therefore, the price-quantity relationship 
between this country’s exports to the United States and U.S. domestic shrimp products is an important issue. 
The estimated parameters for both regular and inverse demand are defined as marginal budget shares. These 
estimates lead to some important conclusions. 
Thailand has the largest marginal shares among all countries and product types, while Mexico and 
Vietnam have the second largest shares. The marginal share coefficient measures the amount of money that 




in response to one dollar change in U.S. expenditures on shrimp. In this instance, one can conclude that 
United States spend more on Thailand, Mexico, and Vietnam shrimp products than other countries and 
domestic shrimp products. Again, this is the same conclusion that is obtained from summary statistics.  
5.2.3. Price Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
Elasticity estimates reveal some important conclusions. The own-price elasticity estimates for 
China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam are almost similar in magnitude, implying that the price sensitivity of 
demand for these countries is approximately the same. In other words, an increase in these countries’ 
shrimp export prices will have a similar impact on these countries’ export quantities. 
The cross-price elasticities present the effect of an increase in a country’s export prices on other 
countries’ quantity of exports. The result (shown in chapter 4) clearly indicates that Thailand’s export prices 
have the largest effect on the quantity of other countries’ exports to the United States. These findings refer 
to an important result; a change in Thailand’s export prices will influence the other countries’ export 
quantities relatively more than a change in other competing country’s export prices. In other words, all 
country’s quantity of exports is more sensitive to a change in Thailand’s export prices than other countries 
prices.  
Theoretically, the negative sign for the own-price elasticity of demand implies that a change in the 
price of exports causes the quantity of exports to decrease. Also, positive cross-price elasticity of demand 
indicates that there is a direct responsiveness between the price of export of a country and the quantity of 
export of another country, which indicate that imported shrimp products from different countries are 
substitute goods, as they are expected to be.  
As indicated in Chapter 4, the author believes the only reason among all above reasons that makes 
Thailand different from China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam is the number of substitutions for the Thailand’s 
shrimp. It seems Thailand’s shrimp has fewer substitutes than China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam’s shrimp 
products. Other factors such as time (the period of study) and income (the amount of money that U.S. spends 




If the price elasticity of demand is less than one (in absolute value), it is said that the commodity is 
inelastic. This means that a change in the price of the good does not cause a large decline in demand. On 
the other hand, if the price elasticity of demand is greater than one, it is said that the good is elastic since 
even a small change in the price of good causes a sharp decrease in demand. The results obtained in this 
study indicate that demand for all countries’ shrimp products is inelastic since they are less than one. 
Another important issue in this relationship is that Thailand’s export-price sensitivity is not as high as that 
of some other countries like China and India. Therefore, according to the reason mentioned earlier, 
Thailand’s shrimp products are relatively more inelastic than those of countries like China, India, Mexico, 
and Vietnam. In other words, consumers will more easily give up buying (or substitute) China’s shrimp 
products than Thailand’s shrimp products with an increase in the price of these countries’ shrimp products. 
5.2.4. Price Elasticity12 of Inverse Demand 
The price elasticity/flexibility of inverse demand reveals another important conclusion. No 
country’s export prices have a significant effect on any size of Gulf landings. The most significant effect is 
about 0.02% on the price of small size Gulf landings for a 1% change in the price of Thailand’s exports to 
the United States. The anti-dumping duties in 2005, which were imposed on six countries to compensate 
for the unfair import prices, did not have a long-term significant improvement for domestic shrimp market. 
However, among these countries, Thailand’s export prices still have the most impact on domestic shrimp 
products’ prices. 
5.2.5. Quantity Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
The quantity flexibility/elasticity of inverse demand demonstrates the sensitivity of Gulf landings 
prices with respect to the volumes of landings. The own-quantity elasticities of Gulf landings are negative, 
implying that a change in Gulf landings will have a negative effect on Gulf landings’ prices, which is 
consistent with consumer demand theory (law of demand). The cross-quantity elasticities are positive; this 
indicates that there are positive relations between the quantity of a selected size landings and the price of 
                                                            
12 As mentioned in Chapter 4, most authors that have worked with a mixed demand model have applied the elasticity 




all other sizes. As mentioned in Chapter 4 the quantity of landings has a small influence on Gulf dockside 
prices.  
5.2.6. Income Elasticity of Ordinary Demand 
One of the most important estimates from this study is the income elasticity of demand functions. 
According to Theil’s definition, the income elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of each country’s 
shrimp exports to a change in U.S. expenditure on shrimp products.  
Vietnam, India, Mexico, China, and Thailand’s income elasticities are greater than one. Therefore, 
one can conclude that a change in U.S. expenditure on shrimp products not only increases the consumption 
of these countries shrimp imports but also the proportion (share) of these products increase relative to U.S. 
total expenditures on shrimp. The elasticity estimates indicate that the income sensitivity of U.S. demand 
for Thailand’s shrimp products is less than that of some other countries such as Vietnam and India. The 
cross-price elasticities have also presented the same conclusion; income and price sensitivities of demand 
for India, Mexico, Vietnam, and China are higher than for Thailand. As previously stated, Thailand has the 
largest share of U.S. expenditures on shrimp products. For this reason, one can conclude that U.S. consumer 
do not easily substitute Thailand shrimp with any other country’s shrimp even if the price of this county’s 
shrimp products goes up.  
According to the homogeneity condition the sum of own-price elasticity, cross-price elasticity, and 
income elasticity of demand for each country should be equal to zero. Thailand’s own-price elasticity of 
demand is less than China, India, Mexico, and Vietnam’s own-price elasticity of demand. Also it is 
presented that Thailand’s cross-price elasticity of demand is larger than these countries, while its income 
elasticity is approximately the same. Therefore, the results indicate Thailand has some degree of market 
power in the U.S. shrimp industry. This result can be added to the conclusion that was made in chapter 4: 
Lerner Index and Thailand’s largest share in U.S. total expenditures on shrimp reveals an important 






5.2.7. Income Elasticity of Inverse Demand 
Income elasticity for inverse demand demonstrates the sensitivity of Gulf dockside price with 
respect to a change in U.S. expenditure on shrimp products. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Gulf dockside 
prices sensitivity relative to a change in U.S. expenditure on shrimp is less than one. This means, for 
example, that if U.S. expenditure on shrimp products increases by 100%, the large, medium, and small size 
landings’ prices will increase by12%, 15%, and 19%, respectively.   
5.3. Implications for Future Research 
The model presented in this dissertation has evolved from several previous studies of the shrimp 
market and mixed demand system areas. This author believes that some theoretical and statistical 
characteristics of the presented model can be appealing for future studies. For example, researchers can 
modify this model for the U.S. shrimp demand market by applying different shrimp product forms such as 
peeled frozen, breaded frozen and canned shrimp.  
Another aspect to future research could concentrate on the U.S. shrimp imports by product forms, 
as well as their source origin. In this study several important results trace back to consumers’ preferences. 
For example, Thailand has the largest share of U.S. expenditures on shrimp. Also the price and income 
sensitivity of demand for Thailand’s shrimp is less than some other countries such as China and India. As 
these issues refer to consumer preferences, the question arises as who are the largest consumers of shrimp 
products in the United States such as individuals, restaurants, or processors. Are individuals aware of and/or 
care about the origin of shrimp imports? To answer such questions, a study that can provide some 
information about the distribution of shrimp buyers in the U.S. would be useful. 
In this study, direct and indirect utilities preference independence restrictions were added to the 
mixed Rotterdam demand system. More constraints, such as block independence preference, can also be 
imposed on the demand system which is less restricted than the preference independence constraint imposed 
on the mixed Rotterdam demand system in this study. Under block preference independence restriction, it 
is assumed that the additive specification (equation 3.35, in chapter 3) is applied to two commodity groups 




groups are neither substitute nor complementary. Imposing this restriction allows one to test whether 
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VARIABLES’ DEFINITION AND TYPE 
Variables and their Definitions 
 
Variable Definition       Variable Type 
 
Chi_PO  China's imports to the U.S. in Pound    Dependent variable 
Chi_PPP China's imports to the U.S. Dollar_Value    Independent variable 
Ecu_PO  Ecuador's imports to the U.S. in Pound    Dependent variable 
Ecu_PPP Ecuador's imports to the U.S. in Dollar_Value   Independent variable 
Indi_PO  India's imports to the U.S. in Pound     Dependent variable 
Indi_PPP India's imports to the U.S. in Dollar_Value    Independent variable 
Indo_PO Indonesia's imports to the U.S. in Pound_Volume   Dependent variable 
Indo_PPP Indonesia's imports to the U.S. Dollar_Value   Independent variable 
Mex_PO Mexico's imports to the U.S. in Pound_Volume   Dependent variable 
Mex_PPP Mexico's imports to the U.S. DollR_Value    Independent variable 
Thi_PO  Thailand's imports to the U.S. in Pound_Volume   Dependent variable 
Thi_PPP Thailand's imports to the U.S. Dollar_Value    Independent variable 
Vie_PO  Vietnam's imports to the U.S. in Pound_Volume   Dependent variable 
Vie_PPP Vietnam's imports to the U.S. Dollar_Value    Independent variable 
Other_PO  All Other Countries's imports to the U.S. in Pound_Volume  Dependent variable 
Other_PPP  All Other Countries's imports to the U.S. Dollar_Value  Independent variable 
L1_PO  Gulf Large_Shrimp Ladings in Pound_Volume, Size 1, 2, 3  Independent variable 
L1_PPP  Gulf Large_Shrimp Ladings Price per Pound, Size 1, 2, 3  Dependent variable 
L2_PO  Gulf Medium_Shrimp Ladings in Pound_Volume, Size 4, 5, 6  Independent variable 
L2_PPP  Gulf Medium_Shrimp Ladings Price per Pound, Size 4, 5, 6  Dependent variable 
L3_PO  Gulf Small_Shrimp Ladings in Pound_Volume, Size 7, 8  Independent variable 














Variables and their Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition       
 
WdC_PO  China’sMean Budget Share * log (Chi_PO/lag(Chi_PO)) 
WdC_PPP  China’s Mean Budget Share * log (Chi_PPP/lag(Chi_PPP))    
WdE_PO  Ecuador’s Mean Budget Share * log (Ecu_PO/lag(Ecu_PO)) 
WdE_PPP  Ecuador’s Mean Budget Share * log (Ecu_PPP/lag(Ecu_PPP)) 
WdIi_PO  India’s Mean Budget Share * log (Indi_PO/lag(Indi_PO)) 
WdIi_PPP  India’s Mean Budget Share * log (Indi_PPP/lag(Indi_PPP)) 
WdIo_PO  Indonesia's Mean Budget Share * log (Indo_PO/lag(Indo_PO)) 
WdIo_PPP  Indonesia's Mean Budget Share * log (Indo_PPP/lag(Indo_PPP)) 
WdM_PO  Mexico's Mean Budget Share * log (Mex_PO/lag(Mex_PO)) 
WdM_PPP  Mexico's Mean Budget Share * log (Mex_PPP/lag(Mex_PPP)) 
WdT_PO  Thailand's Mean Budget Share * log (Thi_PO/lag(Thi_PO)) 
WdT_PPP  Thailand's Mean Budget Share * log (Thi_PPP/lag(Thi_PPP)) 
WdV_PO  Vietnam's Mean Budget Share * log (Vie_PO/lag(Vie_PO)) 
WdV_PPP  Vietnam's Mean Budget Share * log (Vie_PPP/lag(Vie_PPP)) 
WdO_PO   All Other Countries's Mean Budget Share * log (Other_PO/lag(Other_PO)) 
WdO_PPP   All Other Countries's Mean Budget Share * log (Other_PPP/lag(Other_PPP)) 
WdL1_PO  Gulf Large Shrimp Ladings Mean Budget Share * log (L1_PO/lag(L1_PO)) 
WdL1_PPP  Gulf Large Shrimp Ladings Mean Budget Share * log (L1_PPP/lag(L1_PPP)) 
WdL2_PO  Gulf Medium Shrimp Ladings Mean Budget Share * log (L2_PO/lag(L2_PO)) 
WdL2_PPP  Gulf Medium Shrimp Ladings Mean Budget Share * log (L2_PPP/lag(L2_PPP)) 
WdL3_PO  Gulf Small Shrimp Ladings Mean Budget Share * log (L3_PO/lag(L3_PO)) 























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
China's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Ecuador's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure





















1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
India's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure

























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Indonesia's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure


























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mexico's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Thailand's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure






















1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Vietnam's Quantity Component Share in Total Expenditure
























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Other Countries's Quantity Component Share in Total 
Expenditure

























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gulf Large Size Shrimp's Price Component Share in Total 
Expenditure























1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gulf Medium Size Shrimp's Price Component Share in Total 
Expenditure





Maryam Tabarestani was born and raised in Mazandaran, Iran. She completed her bachelor’s 
degree in Pure Economics in Shiraz (Pahlavi) University. She could achieve the first rank student award in 
Economics department, Shiraz (Pahlavi) University. After completing her bachelor’s degree, she started 
working for the Ministry of Cooperatives in Tehran. At the same time, she began her master degree in 
economic planning and development. After two years working she attained the first place employee award 
and got job promotion from economics expert to director of economics research group in the Ministry of 
Cooperatives. Her master thesis subject was “The Estimation of Productivity of Consumer Cooperatives.” 
She got her second master degree in Public Management and during this time she was also teaching 
in Azad University in Tehran, while she was still working for the Ministry of Cooperatives. She 
accomplished a ten-year economics research and a five-year teaching in economics subject experiences 
before she and her family move to the United States of America. During this period she got several awards 
such as the highest second place in economics research on Cooperative Firms, in Iran. She was the 
representative of the Ministry of Cooperatives in Iranian Productivity Organization which was a member 
of Asian Productivity Organization. She had also participated in several national and Asian seminars and 
presented papers. She has several articles (in Farsi) about the economics activities of Cooperative Firms 
and productivity.  
In 2003, she and her family moved to the U.S. and she started her PhD program in agricultural 
economics, in Department of Agricultural Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
in fall 2007. After completing her PhD program, she would be pursuing her research activities, especially 
about the subject that she worked on as her dissertation. 
